River Basin Studies

Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Commission (1997)

7-1-1997

Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal
J. William McDonald

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_service_westernwater_rbs

University of New Mexico
UNM Digital Repository
Recommended Citation
McDonald, J. William. "Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal." (1997).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_service_westernwater_rbs/27

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by
the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission
(1997) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in River Basin Studies by an authorized
administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

The Upper Basins’
Political Conundrum
A Deal is N o t a D e a l

J. William McDonald
U. S. Department of the Interior

Report to the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission

The Upper Basins’
Political Conundrum:
A Deal is Not a Deal

J. William McDonald
U.S. Department of the Interior

Report to the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission

July 1997

The Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission
Under the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-575, Title XXX), Congress directed the
President to undertake a comprehensive review of Federal activities in the 19 Western States that directly or
indirectly affect the allocation and use of water resources, whether surface or subsurface, and to submit a
report of findings to the congressional committees having jurisdiction over Federal Water Programs.
As directed by the statute, the President appointed the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission.
The Commission was composed of 22 members, 10 appointed by the President, including the Secretary of the
Interior and the Secretary of the Army, and 12 members of Congress serving ex-officio by virtue of being the
chair or ranking minority member of the 6 congressional committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction
over the appropriations and programs of water resources agencies. A complete roster is provided below.

Commission Membership
Denise Fort, Chair
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Appointed Members:

Huali Chai
San Jose, California

Patrick O'Toole
Savery, Wyoming

John H. Davidson
Vermillion, South Dakota

Jack Robertson
Portland, Oregon

John Echohawk
Boulder, Colorado

Kenneth L. Salazar
Denver, Colorado

Janet Neuman
Portland, Oregon

Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D.C.
Represented by:
Joe Sax, September 1995 - December 1996
Patricia J. Beneke, December 1996 Secretary of the Army
Washington, DC
Represented by:
Dr. John H. Zirschky

Members of Congress (Ex-officio Members):
U.S. Senate: Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Hon. Frank Murkowski, Chairman
Hon. Dale Bumpers, Ranking Minority Member
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston (September 1995 to January 1997)
U.S. Senate: Subcommittee on Water and Power, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Hon. Jon Kyl, Chairman
Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Ranking Minority Member
Hon. Larry E. Craig (September 1995 to January 1997)
Hon. Bill Bradley (September 1995 to January 1997)
U.S. Senate: Committee on Appropriations
Hon. Ted Stevens, Chairman
Hon. Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Minority Member
Hon. Mark O. Hatfield (September 1995 to January 1997)
U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Resources
Hon. Don Young, Chairman
Hon. George Miller, Ranking Minority Member
U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Hon. Bud Shuster, Chairman
Hon. James L. Oberstar, Ranking Minority Member
U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Appropriations
Hon. Bob Livingston, Chairman
Hon. David R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member

This is an Independent Report to the Commission
The report published herein was prepared for the Commission as part of its information gathering activity.
The views, conclusions, and recommendations are those of the author(s) and are not intended to represent the
views of the Commission, the Administration, or Members of Congress serving on the Commission.
Publication by the Commission does not imply endorsement of the author's findings or recommendations.
This report is published to share with the public the information and ideas gathered and considered by the
Commission in its deliberations. The Commission's views, conclusions, and recommendations will be set
forth in the Commission's own report.
Additional copies of this publication may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service,
5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia, 22161; phone 703-487-4650.

Preface
This paper has been prepared at the request of the Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission. Formation of the Commission was authorized
and directed by the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 (Pub. L.
No. 102-575, Title XXX, 106 Stat. 4693).
Pursuant to section 3003(a) of the Act, the President is directed:
...to undertake a comprehensive review of Federal activities in the nineteen
Western States which directly or indirectly affect the allocation and use of
water resources, and to submit a report on ... [his] findings, together with
recommendations, if any, to ... [certain committees of Congress].
In turn, section 3004(a) of the Act provides that the Commission is "to assist
in the preparation and review" of this report. Section 3005 tasks the
Commission with reviewing and examining, among other things:
• present and anticipated water resources problems in the West,
• current and proposed Federal water resources programs,
• the history, use, and effectiveness of various institutional
arrangements to address problems of water use and development, and
• the legal regime governing the development and use of water and the
respective roles of state and Federal governments over the allocation
and use of water.
The conclusions and recommendations presented in this paper are those of
the author alone, not of the Commission. This paper is but one of many
studies, reports, and other sources of information and analysis to which the
Commission will look as it assists in the preparation of the report which the
President is required to submit.
The first edition of this paper was dated May, 1997. This second edition
differs from the first only in that footnotes 55-58 have been inserted (they
misprinted in the first edition) and the format of a few statutory citations in
other footnotes has been corrected. The text of the paper is unchanged.
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Introduction
In the 17 western states1, division of the major interstate river basins into
upper and lower basins has arisen naturally as a matter of topography,
climate, hydrology, and economics -- and has been confirmed institutionally
as a matter of law and politics. In turn, one of the salient attributes of the
history of the development of the West's water resources has been nearly
unabated political and legal conflict between the upper and lower basins
within most, if not all, interstate river systems.
Over the past 100 years, these conflicts have often been played out in the
context of Congressional consideration of legislation which either ratified
interstate compacts or authorized federal water resources development
projects (i.e., authorized federal financing for the construction of storage
reservoirs and water delivery systems, hydropower facilities, flood control
features, and navigation improvements). The legislation which emerged from
the Congressional arena was frequently proffered as the vehicle by which the
"comprehensive" development of a basin's water and hydropower resources
would be achieved to the mutual benefit of both the upper and lower portions
of that basin.
The legislative process being what it is, some degree of compromise and
accommodation was usually in order -- the political and geographical fulcrum
of which was the point of demarcation between the upper and lower basins in
any given river drainage. Thus, federal water project authorizing legislation
usually contained specific projects for both the upper and lower basins.
Furthermore, such legislation was often premised, implicitly if not explicitly,
on the expectation (at least in the eyes of upper basin interests) that
construction of authorized projects would proceed more or less
simultaneously in both basins so that the agreed upon development of each
basin's water resources, and the attendant regional economic benefits, would
be realized concurrently.
Whatever the upper basins' expectations, the reality has been significantly
different. In several instances, federal development of the water resources
allocated, apportioned, or otherwise available to a lower basin state or states
has proceeded largely as contemplated in the authorizing legislation. But the
counterpart upper basin state or states have found the construction of a
significant number of the federal projects which were authorized for them to
Section 3002 of the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-575,
Title XXX, 106 Stat. 4693), refers to the 19 western states, consisting of the 17 western
continental states, Hawaii, and Alaska. This paper deals only with circumstances in the
17 western continental states, which are commonly referred to as the "reclamation states"
because they are the beneficiaries of the original federal reclamation program. See the Act of
June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, § 1, 32 Stat. 388, which applied to the western states other than
Texas, with that original act being extended to Texas by the Acts of February 25, 1905,
ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814 and June 12, 1906, ch. 3288, 34 Stat. 259 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C.A. § 391 (1986 & Supp. 1997)).
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have been stymied by a variety of factors, the primary ones being federal
budgetary constraints, faltering project economics, new environmental
requirements, and shifting political sands. Even when some portion of the
contemplated development has occurred, upper basin water interests may
find themselves unable to reap what they believe to be a "fair share" of the
benefits which are now, or could now be, generated by those projects.
In the view of upper basin water resources development interests, the result
has been that they have not "gotten their due." They argue that "deals"
memorialized in the form of authorizing legislation should be honored by the
federal executive and legislative branches of government, or suitable
contemporary substitutes provided, because it is "unfair" and "inequitable"
for the lower basins to have had the federal government's "promises" to them
fulfilled (i.e., federal resources expended to their benefit), while the upper
basins have gone wanting or, worse yet, both have gone wanting and have
had their states' riverine resources dammed and inundated mostly to the
benefit of downstream states.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the Commission should
endeavor to address itself to the issue of federal water project development
having not proceeded in accordance with past political agreements. The
history of Congressional legislation which ratified interstate compacts and/or
authorized federal water resources developments in the Colorado River and
Missouri River Basins, and the actual results of federal development in those
basins, will be drawn upon for illustrative purposes.2 While other basins
could also have been examined, the history of the political agreements
reached in these two basins are the primary examples of upper basin/lower
basin "deals" and serve to fully frame, in the author's opinion, the question to
be addressed.

2
The political, legislative, legal, and institutional history of water resources
development in these basins has been, for the most part, well documented and summarized
in numerous publications. Thus, no effort has been made in the course of preparing this
paper to search for and review original source materials. Rather, the author has relied upon
the many thorough and competent works which have already been written. Perusal by the
interested reader of the secondary sources referenced in the footnotes in this paper will yield
a wealth of citations to original materials, such as government reports and statistics,
Congressional committee hearings and reports, histories of Congressional floor debates,
minutes of compact negotiations, official agency correspondence, personal papers, and
brochures, newsletters, newspaper articles, and other materials written contemporaneously
with the events at hand.
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Two disclaimers are in order at the outset. First, the phrases "upper basin
water development interests," "upper basin interests," and "upper basin
states" will be used interchangeably in this paper to mean those interests,
private and governmental, in the upper basins of an interstate river system
who support the construction of water development projects. In the past,
that would have almost invariably included -- in addition to private water
users; local irrigation, conservation, and conservancy districts; and
municipalities -- state governments acting through their governors and state
water agency officials. However, in using those phrases in this paper when
applied to the present time, the author does not presume, one way or
another, what an upper basin state government's current policies and
positions are with respect to water development in general (federally
financed or otherwise) or specific potential federal projects. This is because
one can no longer make across the board statements about unequivocal state
government support for water project development in the West, a telling
observation in and of itself about the question to which this paper is
addressed.
Second, it is to be acknowledged that there are other aspects to the question
of "equities" in the federal development of the West's water resources besides
the upper/lower basin issue, most notably with respect to the fulfillment of
the United States' trust obligations to Native Americans.3 This paper does
not treat these matters, but certainly not because they are unimportant.
They are not covered only because the author was not asked to address
himself to them, as others are doing so for the Commission's benefit.

An Overview of the Institutional Setting
Introduction
Aridity and high variability in stream flows from year to year characterize
the climate and hydrology of the West. Furthermore, most river systems in
the 17 western states receive a very high percentage of their annual flow

For a thought provoking treatment of the question of who were "the winners and the
losers" in the development of the Colorado River Basin, see H. INGRAM, WATER POLITICS:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 9-23 (1990).
3
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from snowmelt, not rainfall, and therefore receive most of their total annual
runoff in only a three or four month period from April through July.4
As a consequence of these conditions, intensive agriculture usually cannot be
sustained without the benefit of extensive irrigation. Also, in order to have
reliable, year-round and year-to-year water supplies, reservoirs are needed to
store peak flows for later distribution in the low runoff months and drier
years.
These physical circumstances have led to the development of legal and
institutional systems for defining rights in and to the use of water that are
unique to the West. These are very briefly outlined below.

Western Water Law
In the East, South, and Midwest, where rainfall is generally sufficient for
growing crops and where stream flows are sustained by rainfall on a
relatively uniform basis, states adopted the English common law riparian
doctrine. Under the riparian system, only those who own land bordering a
river are entitled to make "reasonable use" of the water of that river on the
same land, and only then if their use does not interfere with "reasonable
uses" by others who also own land adjacent to the same river (be they
upstream of or downstream from the specified riparian user). "Reasonable
use" is typically not quantified.5
Given the relative scarcity of rainfall in the West, and the variability of
runoff within a year and from year to year, the western states developed a
different legal system for allocating water supplies. It is known as the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The doctrine initially developed as the

4
The major exceptions are the coastal rivers in California, Oregon, and Washington and
the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers in the Central Valley of California, where winter
rainfall accounts for a large percentage of annual stream flows, with peak flows occurring in
December, January, and February. The Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers are also fed by
snowmelt runoff from the Sierra Nevada and thus typically experience a second peak of
runoff in the April through June timeframe.

For a general description of the riparian doctrine, see D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 15-73 (3d ed. 1997).
5
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custom of the California gold mining camps in the mid-1800s6 and eventually
spread in statutory form to all 17 western states. However, several western
states have developed hybrid systems that employ elements of both the
riparian and prior appropriation doctrines.7
In essence, the doctrine of prior appropriation provides that the one who first
put a water supply to a beneficial use has the superior right to it in times of
shortage as against those who came later in time. Succinctly put, "first in
time is first in right." Under this system, holders of junior rights (i.e., those
who came later in time) must forego the use of water so that holders of senior
rights (i.e., those who came first) can receive a full supply of water if stream
flows are not sufficient for all users. Furthermore, the amount of water to
which one is entitled is quantitatively defined (usually in cubic feet per
second or acre-feet) and water can be put to use on lands not adjacent to the
stream from which they are diverted.
In whatever form adopted by each western state, the doctrine of prior
appropriation came to govern the relative rights of claimants to the flows of a
given stream within the boundaries of a given state. But the rivers of the
West, as elsewhere, have a proclivity for crossing state lines, thus giving rise
to the need to define the relative rights of water users in one state vis-a-vis
those in another to the waters of such interstate streams.

Apportionment of Interstate Rivers 8
Allocation of the waters of interstate streams has been accomplished in three
ways: by litigation, by negotiation of compacts between states, and by an act
of Congress. While the former can and has involved litigation between
private claimants,9 this paper will address only litigation between states. All

Overviews of the historical roots and evolution of the prior appropriation system may
be found in 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 157-80 (Natural Resources Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Misc. Publication No. 1206, 1971); D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at
77-82; Johnson and DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to
Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 Nat. Resources J. 347-52 (1989); and
Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 317-20 (1985).
6

7

See D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 190-206, 214-16.

Unless noted to the contrary, this discussion is drawn from D. GETCHES, supra note
5, at 402-415.
8

9

Id. at 397-402.
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three methods have been employed in the basins being examined in
this paper, as discussed below and in the next section of this paper.
1. Litigation
Interstate litigation is brought in the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to its
original jurisdiction.10 In such cases, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is
exclusive11 and it acts as a trial court (i.e., as the trier of the facts). In
interstate litigation involving competing claims to the waters of interstate
streams, the court applies the doctrine of equitable apportionment. This
doctrine was first announced in 1907 in Kansas v. Colorado,12 which involved
the Arkansas River:
A basic tenet of the doctrine is that "equality of right," not equality of
amounts apportioned, should govern. "Equality of right" simply means
that the states stand "on the same level," or "on an equal plane, ... in point
of power and right, under our constitutional system."13
In Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas generally applied the riparian doctrine, while
Colorado had unequivocally embraced the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Thus, this case left unresolved whether and how the doctrine of prior
appropriation would be applied by the Supreme Court in apportioning the
waters of an interstate stream between two states which both employed that
doctrine.

10

U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.

11

28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (1993).

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (White, J., and McKenna, J., concurring in
result).
12

13

6

D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 405, quoting from language in the Court's decision.
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The Supreme Court addressed this question in 1922 in Wyoming v.
Colorado,14 which involved the Laramie River, a tributary of the North Platte
River:
We conclude that Colorado's objections to the doctrine of appropriation as
a basis of decision are not well taken, and that it furnishes the only basis
which is consonant with the principles of right and equity applicable to
such a controversy as this is. ... The principle on which it proceeds is not
[sic] less applicable to interstate streams and controversies than to others.
Both States pronounce the rule just and reasonable.... ...[I]ts application to
such a controversy as is here presented cannot be other than eminently just
and equitable to all concerned.15
Although strictly applied in Wyoming v. Colorado, the Supreme Court has
sometimes deviated from the prior appropriation doctrine in subsequent
cases:
Application of the appropriation doctrine is ... qualified in that protection
of established uses may be more equitable than strict priority. Factors that
inform equitable apportionment (and that might justify deviation from
strict priority) include:
(1) Physical and climatic conditions;
(2) Consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river;
(3) Character and rate of return flows;

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). The Court's original 1922 decree was
amended the very next year in Wyoming v. Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1923) (decree amended).
Enforcement actions then ensued in the 1930s. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494
(1932) (motion to dismiss overruled), Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936) (injunction
granted), and Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940) (reh'g denied). Upon joint motion of
the parties, the original 1922 decree, as amended in 1923, was vacated and a new decree
entered in Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953 (1957) (jt. mtn. granted, decree vacated, decree
entered).
14

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 470 (1922). In arriving at the decision that the
doctrine of prior appropriation should apply to the Laramie River litigation, notwithstanding
the general principles of equitable apportionment which it had articulated in the 1907 case
of Kansas v. Colorado, supra note 12, the Court took great pains to distinguish the facts of
the earlier case from the case at bar, particularly on the grounds that Kansas and Colorado
were not both prior appropriation states, whereas both Wyoming and Colorado had adopted
the doctrine of prior appropriation. 259 U.S. at 464-65.
15
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(4) Extent of established uses and economics built on them;
(5) Availability of storage water;
(6) Practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas; and
(7) Damage to upstream areas compared to the benefits to downstream
areas if upstream uses are curtailed.16

2. Interstate Compacts
The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution recognizes, by negative
implication, the power of the states to negotiate interstate agreements,
subject to the consent of Congress:
No state shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement
or compact with another state, or with a foreign power ....17
Such compacts are binding on the signatory states and on the individual
citizens of the compacting states.
One of the virtues of an interstate compact is that it allows the signatory
parties:
... to allocate unappropriated water, thus making a "present appropriation
for future use." Ability to make these determinations in advance is crucial
to long range water project planning.18
In the context of this paper, this observation is particularly relevant to the
Colorado River Basin. It was concern on the part of upper basin states about
the rapid pace of development in California versus the slow pace of
development in the upper basin, coupled with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to apply the doctrine of prior appropriation in the 1922 decision in

D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 405-06. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., and Rutledge, J., dissent), 345 U.S. 981 (1953); Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (remanded); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissent).
16
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17

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

18

D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 407.
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Wyoming v. Colorado, that prompted the upper basin states to consummate
the negotiation of the Colorado River Compact later that year, the history of
which negotiations will be chronicled in the next section of this paper. From
the perspective of upper basin water development interests, an interstate
compact was desirable because it would allocate to them "in perpetuity" for
future use then unappropriated and unused waters of the upper basin,19
thus avoiding the outcome which the Supreme Court had reached on
the Laramie River in Wyoming v. Colorado.

3. Acts of Congress
There has been but one instance in which the allocation of the waters of an
interstate river was effected by Congressional action. This occurred when
Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act in 1928.20 Since the
enactment of this legislation is germane to the history of the political deals
made in the Colorado River Basin, details concerning the events that led to
the passage of this legislation, and what the act called for, will be addressed
in the next section of this paper. Suffice it to say for now that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Boulder Canyon Project Act in litigation
brought against California by Arizona, found that Congress has, under the
navigation and general welfare clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the
authority to divide the waters of an interstate stream by legislative
enactment.

Federal Irrigation Projects

19
Whether western states can indeed rely on interstate compacts to achieve protection
"in perpetuity" as against the future actions of Congress is a legal and policy issue which is
far beyond the scope of this paper. Insofar as the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution may be concerned, see, e.g., Carlson and Boles, Contrary View
of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower
Basins, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 21-28 - 21-29 (1986) ("Congress probably possesses the power
under the commerce clause ... to modify an interstate compact by statute."). However, with
respect to the issue of whether it is permissible for federal environmental regulatory laws to
adversely impact a state's ability to develop and consume waters allocated to it by an
interstate compact, the analysis turns on considerably more than just the Commerce Clause.

Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 617-617t (1986)).
20

9

The Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal

While western water law and judicial, legislative, or negotiated allocations of
interstate rivers provided the necessary legal framework for water resources
development, paper rights and wet water are two different things.
... Almost everywhere in the West, water must be taken out of water courses
and applied ... to the fields by irrigation. Appropriation law was well
suited to meet the needs of farmers who depended on irrigation. The
doctrine assured early appropriators of legal rights to a sure supply of
water ....
But in many areas throughout the West small farmers required more than
a legal doctrine to get water to their fields. Crops needed water in the late
summer and early fall, long after snowmelt from the mountains had
flowed past. ... Private enterprise in the form of farming and ranching
cooperative associations was inadequate to raise the capital to build dams
for storing the spring runoff for summer irrigation or to construct canals
and laterals for transporting the water.21
To some extent, the private efforts to undertake irrigation in the 1860s and
1870s were successful. The first systems to be constructed irrigated lands
immediately adjacent to local streams, were therefore the cheapest and
easiest ones to build, and the water rights which they held were senior
enough to permit reliance on natural streamflows. But as attempts were
made to bring lands further from a river under irrigation, and as new
appropriators found that a direct flow right22 would not get them through an
irrigation season because more senior rights could claim the entire flow of a
river as supplies dwindled in late summer, construction of storage reservoirs
and ever longer delivery systems became necessary. However, this made new
irrigation financially infeasible in many cases. As a consequence, the 1880s
and 1890s saw numerous failed attempts by the states and private investors
to reclaim the arid lands of the West.23

21

Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 320. Footnote omitted.

22
A direct flow right is a right to divert water from a stream at any given moment and
immediately put that water to a beneficial use. In contrast, a storage right is the right to
store water in a reservoir for release and application to a beneficial use at a later time.
23
Excellent summaries of private efforts to finance the development of irrigation
systems may be found in P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT
634-54 (1968) and M. ROBINSON, WATER FOR THE WEST: THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, 1902-1977 1-12 (1979). For a complete history, see D. PISANI, TO
RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902 (1992).
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It was against this backdrop that the "irrigation movement" of the 1890s took
hold.24 The movement, which viewed reclamation of the arid lands of the
West to be as much a matter of agrarian idealism as practical economics,
sought support for federal legislation which would provide the necessary
financing for irrigation works. The movement achieved its goal with the
enactment by Congress of the Reclamation Act of 1902,25 which created the
federal reclamation program. The Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department
of the Interior (Reclamation), administers the program.26
Despite the availability of federal financing, the Reclamation Act of 1902 still
did not yield financially successful irrigation projects. Thus, over the next
40 years, the program evolved in a number of respects.27 For the purposes of
this paper, it is sufficient to summarize what became the main attributes of
the federal reclamation program by 1939:28
1. Construction of projects by Reclamation has been, with but a few
exceptions in more recent years, totally financed by Congressional
appropriations.
2. Subject to item 6 below, construction costs allocable to irrigation
purposes are repayable by irrigators, albeit without interest and over
periods of 40 to 50 years (in contrast to the 1902 act's original
requirement that repayment be made within ten years). Furthermore,

See D. PISANI, supra note 23, at 127-272 and M. ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 10-18.
The irrigation movement was imbedded in the much broader conservation movement of the
1890s and early 1900s, the history of which is extensively chronicled in S. HAYS,
CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959).
24

Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of
43 U.S.C.A. ch. 12 (1986 & Supp. 1997)).
25

26
The agency which was created in 1902 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the
federal reclamation program was originally known as the Reclamation Service and was a
component of the Geological Survey, U. S. Department of the Interior. The Reclamation
Service became a separate bureau within the department in 1907 and was renamed the
Bureau of Reclamation in 1923.
27

See generally M. ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 19-59.

1939 is selected because the Reclamation Projects Act of 1939, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1187
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 485-485k (1986)) essentially brought to completion
the major changes wrought in the federal reclamation program during its first 40 years. The
program as it existed in 1939 was largely what applied to developments in the Colorado and
Missouri River Basins during the 1940s, 50s and 60s, although further modifications in the
program were still made by Congress after 1939.
28
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repayment usually did not have to be initiated until after a five to ten
year development period following the first delivery of project water.
3. Construction costs allocable to hydropower and municipal and
industrial water supply purposes are repaid by those users with interest,
but interest rates are very favorable and 40 to 50 years is allowed for
repayment.
4. The construction costs of multipurpose dams and reservoirs which are
allocable to fish and wildlife and recreation are non-reimbursable,
although the costs of separate recreation and fish and wildlife facilities
(so-called separable costs) eventually became reimbursable, at 50 and
25 percent, respectively, under current law.29
5. Water and power users have to pay all annual operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs which are allocable to reimbursable purposes
such as irrigation water supplies, municipal and industrial water
supplies, and hydropower. O&M costs of multiple purpose dams and
reservoirs which are allocable to recreation and fish and wildlife are
borne by the government, but the O&M costs of separate features
devoted to these purposes must be borne by a non-federal entity.
6. On many projects, if irrigators lack the ability to pay both O&M costs
and construction costs, then they have to pay only O&M costs and such
portion of the construction costs allocable to irrigation purposes as are
within their "ability to pay." The portion of construction costs which
exceeds irrigators' ability to pay is recovered by increasing the charges to
those who purchase hydropower from a project (i.e., the power users bear
not only the O&M and construction costs allocable to the power function,
but also a portion of the construction costs, although without interest,
allocable to the irrigation purpose).
Obviously, the federal reclamation program constituted a very attractive
subsidy to those interested in water development. Not surprisingly, this set
the stage for numerous conflicts, and eventual political compromises and
agreements, between upper and lower basin interests as each sought to gain
a share of the Congressional dollars which flowed into the federal

29
Federal Water Project Recreation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 460l-13 (1993)). Separable fish
and wildlife costs were originally reimbursable at 50 percent. Federal Water Project
Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-72, § 2, 79 Stat. 213 (1965). This was reduced to 25 percent in
1974. Act of March 7, 1974, § 77(a), 88 Stat. 33.
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reclamation program.30 The stakes, measured in terms of regional economic
development, were very large.

Federal Flood Control and Navigation Projects
Federal involvement in navigation improvements to the Nation's rivers dates
back to the very early 1800s, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was
first authorized to remove snags from the Mississippi River. Over the course
of that century, vast numbers of projects -- from removal of snags, to the
dredging of channels, to the construction of dams and locks -- were
authorized in the Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Missouri and other major
rivers of the Nation. In general, both the cost of constructing capital
improvements, and the cost of operating and maintaining them, were borne
by the federal government, with there being no requirement for the
repayment of these costs by benefitted users until recently.
Federal involvement in flood control improvements likewise dates back well
into the 1800s, again through the Corps of Engineers. Improvements
initially were limited to dikes, levees, cutoffs, and other manipulations of a
river channel's configuration. Authorization of federally financed reservoir
projects for flood control purposes followed around the turn of the century.
Originally, the costs of constructing and maintaining flood control facilities
were, as with navigation projects, borne entirely by the United States, with
no repayment required from those protected by such facilities. Congress
changed this policy in 1936, when it enacted legislation requiring states or
their political subdivisions, at their expense, to: (a) provide all lands,
easements, and rights-of-way required for a flood control project, and (b)
operate and maintain facilities after they had been constructed.31
If flood control is incorporated into a multipurpose Corps of Engineers'
reservoir project (e.g., a project for power generation and flood control), then
the joint costs of multipurpose project features are allocated among the

More than $16 billion dollars have been invested in reclamation projects. These
projects deliver water annually to about 28 million people and about 10 million acres of
irrigated land (which is about one-third of the irrigated acreage in the 17 western states),
they generate approximately 60 billion kilowatt hours each year (making the Bureau of
Reclamation the nation's second largest producer of hydroelectric power and 11th largest
electric utility, based on generating capacity), they provide water-based recreation to about
80 million visitors each year, and they have prevented nearly $200 million in average
annual flood damages between 1950 and 1990.
30

Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, § 3, 49 Stat. 1571 (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 701c
(1986)).
31
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various purposes, with the flood control purpose being non-reimbursable. If
recreation or fish and wildlife purposes are included with a Corps of
Engineers' flood control project, then the construction and O&M costs
allocable to these purposes are subject to the same arrangements as
discussed above for the federal reclamation program.32
In short, federal navigation and flood control projects, as with the federal
reclamation program, presented an attractive subsidy. This too helped set
the stage for conflicts between upper and lower basins as each sought a slice
of the federal water development project pie.

The Colorado River Basin: The Agreements and the Results
Introduction
The Colorado River and its major tributaries rise in the Rocky Mountains in
Colorado and Wyoming. Its drainage basin encompasses portions of those
two states, as well as portions of California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah,
and essentially all of Arizona. Except in the mountains which ring the
northwestern, northern and eastern boundaries of the Colorado River
Basin, the climate of the basin ranges from arid steppes to deserts.
Very small portions of the basin also lie in Mexico, although these desert
drainage areas contribute no flows to the river. What is important is that the
mainstem of the Colorado River flows into Mexico on its way to the Gulf of
California and is an important water resource to that country.
Nearly all of the flow of the river arises in the upper portion of the Colorado
River Basin. The average annual undepleted flow of the river at Lee Ferry,
Arizona, which is the dividing point between the upper and lower basins, is
about 15 million acre-feet per year.33 The average supply which arises in the
tributaries below that point is in dispute to some extent, but averages no
more than 3 million acre-feet per year, and likely is less.

32

Federal Water Project Recreation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-13 (1993).

UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT
21-28 (1996).
33
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The Historical Agreements 34
The lower reaches of the lower mainstem35 of the Colorado River were used
for commercial navigation to a small extent in the early years of this century.
However, the primary interest of Arizona and California 100 years ago was
to dam the lower mainstem for flood control and water conservation storage
so that they could irrigate their fields and provide water to their growing
population centers, the principal ones of which were outside of the basin
(especially in southern California).
Concerns on the part of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming (the
"Upper Division States"36), and even Arizona and Nevada, about the rate of
irrigation development in California dated to the turn of the century. Since
the introduction of Colorado River water into California's Imperial Valley in
1901:
... leaders in the Colorado River Basin outside of California had become
troubled. All recognized that the future development of their areas
depended heavily on the Colorado, and they watched uneasily the advances
being made by a state that contributed the least amount of runoff to the
river.
Particularly disturbed were residents in the upper portion of the basin
where the growing season was shorter and the lands less easily watered
than in California or Arizona. The upper states wanted reclamation
projects of their own, including some that would benefit areas outside the
basin, especially in western Utah and eastern Colorado. ...

Unless noted to the contrary in subsequent footnotes, this summary is drawn from
Hundley, The West Against Itself: The Colorado River -- An Institutional History, in NEW
COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER -- MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
9 (G. Weatherford and F. Brown ed.s 1986).
34

In this paper, the "lower mainstem" of the river will mean the mainstem of the
Colorado River downstream from the present location of Hoover Dam in the Black Canyon
east of Las Vegas.
35

Article II of the Colorado River Compact defines the "States of the Upper Division" as
the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, while the "States of the Lower
Division" is defined to mean the States of Arizona, California, and Nevada. For the purposes
of this paper, these will be shortened to "Upper Division States" and "Lower Division States,"
respectively. Colorado River Compact in DOCUMENTS ON THE USE AND CONTROL OF
THE WATERS OF INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL STREAMS 53 (T. Witmer ed.
1968) [hereinafter T. WITMER].
36
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Heightening such concern throughout the Upper Basin were a series of
events in early 1922. The first occurred in February when the Interior
Department issued the long-awaited ... Fall-Davis Report -- ... it
recommended construction of an All-American Canal, a storage reservoir
"at or near Boulder Canyon," and the development of hydroelectric power
to repay the cost of the dam. The next development that disconcerted the
upper states took place in April, when [California's] Congressman Phil
Swing ... and Senator Hiram Johnson ... introduced a bill to implement the
report's recommendations. This Boulder Canyon ... bill met with
immediate hostility from Upper Basin representative [sic], who mounted a
vigorous campaign against it.
Still another cause for alarm in the upper states occurred two months later.
This involved ... the doctrine of prior appropriation .... This principle was
recognized within each basin state, but uncertainty existed over whether it
applied to users in two or more states on a common stream. In June 1922
the U.S. Supreme Court, in Wyoming v. Colorado, eliminated all doubt by
announcing that the rule of priority applied regardless of state lines. Now
even the law seemed to favor faster-growing states like California. Upper
Basin leaders responded to the decision by reaffirming adamant opposition
to all reclamation on the lower Colorado [River] until their own interests
were safeguarded.
The leader in defining those interests and in devising a protective strategy
was Delph Carpenter of Colorado. ... [H]e had long advocated compacts ...
to resolve interstate disputes. Although no states had demonstrated the
practicality of his idea by apportioning water among themselves, Carpenter
believed that the usual recourse to litigation was a mistake .... His
participation in Colorado's lengthy Supreme Court battle ... [in Wyoming
v. Colorado] had reinforced these views .... If the states did not put their
houses in order, he feared that the federal government might do it for them,
thus "weakening ... state autonomy on all rivers."
In 1920, ... Carpenter called for a compact covering the Colorado River. It
was an idea whose time had come. ... In August 1921 Congress consented
to the negotiation of a compact. ...
The commissioners [i.e., the negotiators for each state and the United
States] spent most of 1922 in fruitless bargaining. ... Finally convinced
that they would be unable to settle on a specific volume of water for each
state, they decided to concentrate instead on apportioning the river between
the upper and lower sections of the basin. But even that decision was more
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easily reached than implemented. ... Nonetheless, it set the stage for the
final round of talks scheduled for November 1922 in New Mexico.
Great pressure for a settlement permeated the negotiations which began on
November 9 .... Californians were driven by their desire for the ... [Boulder
Canyon] Bill, which had been bottled up in Congress by Upper Basin
representatives in control of key reclamation committees. Upper Basin
leaders feared that if they did not negotiate a water supply for themselves,
a disastrous flood on the lower river might stampede Congress into giving
Californians the legislation that they wanted. "We simply must use every
endeavor to bring about a compact ...," pleaded Delph Carpenter,
"otherwise ... we may never again have a like opportunity."37
While the negotiations were in fact completed that month, the stage had only
been set for years, nay decades, of litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court
and of political wrangling in the legislative forum of Congress.
The Colorado River Compact38 does not allocate the waters of the "Colorado
River System"39 to the individual states in the basin. Rather, it apportions
"in perpetuity" 7.5 million acre-feet per annum of "beneficial consumptive
use" to the "Upper Basin" and to the "Lower Basin."40 Having done this, it
then imposes on the Upper Division States the obligation not to cause the
flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry, Arizona,41 to be depleted below a

37
Hundley, supra note 34, at 14-17. Footnotes omitted. Extensive histories of the
negotiation of the Colorado River Compact may be found in R. OLSON, THE COLORADO
RIVER COMPACT (1926) (thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Harvard University, and published by the author; copy
available in the library of the Upper Colorado River Commission, Salt Lake City, Utah); and
N. HUNDLEY, WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1975).

Colorado River Compact in T. WITMER, supra note 36 [hereinafter Colorado River
Compact].
38

39
The compact defines the "... Colorado River System ... [as] that portion of the Colorado
River and its tributaries within the United States of America." Id. art. II(a).

Id. art. III(a). The Lower Basin is then given the right to increase its beneficial
consumptive use by an additional 1 million acre-feet per annum. Id. art. III(b).
40

41
"Lee Ferry" is a point on the mainstem one mile below the mouth of the Paria River,
which in turn is about 15 miles downstream from the present Glen Canyon Dam. Id. art.
II(e). The "Upper Basin" and "Lower Basin" are defined as the drainage areas of the
Colorado River System above and below, respectively, Lee Ferry and the areas outside of the
drainage area of the Colorado River System which are "beneficially served" by waters
diverted from above or below, respectively, Lee Ferry. The latter component of these
definitions recognizes that major transbasin diversions are made out of the Colorado River
System. Id. art.s II(f), II(g).
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certain amount.42 These two features of the compact, along with certain
other provisions, were intended to bring legal certainty as to what is
available for beneficial consumptive use in each basin.43
The compact does not even mention, let alone promise, federally financed
water resources development either to the Upper or the Lower Division
States. Thus, a means of financing water projects still had to be found by
water users in both basins.
Because of then unresolved differences between Arizona and California
about what their respective shares of the Lower Basin apportionment should
be, Arizona was the lone state which did not ratify the compact when
negotiations were completed.44 This left the compact in limbo, since by its
terms it could not take effect until it was ratified by all seven basin states
and Congress.45 The need for financing for water projects, coupled with
Arizona's refusal to ratify the Colorado River Compact, prompted the next
chapter in the river's institutional history.
The Upper Division States were anxious to have the compact take effect, as it
would ensure that the doctrine of prior appropriation would not be applied as
among the seven basin states. For its part, California was anxious to gain
Congressional authorization of and appropriations for the construction of the

The compact provides that: "The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of
the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any
period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series ...." Id. art. III(d).
42

The compact has arguably left certain matters unsettled principally because the flow
of the river appears to be substantially less than was assumed to be the case at the time the
compact was being negotiated. Based upon the 25 year period of record then available, the
average annual virgin flow of the river at Lee Ferry appeared to be about 16.8 million acrefeet. However, from 1922-1996, the average annual virgin flow at Lee Ferry has only been
14.2 million acre-feet. UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 25-26.
Thus, the legal certainty sought by the Upper Division States may not, in retrospect, have
been achieved. See, e.g., Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 413, 415-427 (1985) and Carlson and Boles, supra note 19.
43
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The other six states' acts of ratification are cited in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 59.

45

Colorado River Compact, supra note 38, at art. XI.
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All American Canal46 and Hoover Dam47 pursuant to the federal reclamation
program.
The deal that was eventually struck, over Arizona's objections, was embodied
in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.48 In this act, Congress authorized
construction of the massive Hoover Dam (over 26 million acre-feet of storage
capacity) on the lower mainstem of the Colorado River,49 as desired by
California, in exchange for California having to agree, by act of its
legislature,50 to a limit of 4.4 million acre-feet per year on its share of the
Lower Basin's apportionment of 7.5 million acre-feet per year of beneficial
consumptive use per annum, plus one-half of any surplus available to the
Lower Basin. California did this the next year.51 Furthermore, the act
provided that it became effective, as did Congress' ratification of the
Colorado River Compact, only when the compact was ratified by six of the
seven states.52

46
The canal which first served California's Imperial Valley diverted water from the
Colorado River south of the international border with Mexico and traversed Mexico before
entering the United States. Mexico's price for this arrangement was the right to take onehalf of the water diverted. Since the turn of the century, Imperial Valley irrigators had
dreamed of having a canal located entirely within the United States -- ergo, the All-American
Canal.

Hoover Dam would tame the devastating floods to which the lower mainstem of the
river had been periodically subjected and firm up the water supplies that would be
apportioned to the Lower Basin when the compact took effect.
47

48
Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 617-617t (1986)). The act took its name from the then anticipated location of
Hoover Dam in Boulder Canyon. However, when Reclamation did further engineering work,
the Black Canyon proved to be a better site and is where Hoover Dam was in fact
constructed.

Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 1, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §
617 (1986)).
49

50
Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 4(a), 45 Stat. 1058 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 617c(a) (1986)).
51

Act of March 4, 1929, Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 37; Deering's Gen. L. (1944), Act 1491.

Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, §§ 4, 13, 45 Stat. 1058, 1064 (1928) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 617c, 617l (1986)).
52
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Ratification of the compact for a second time by the states other than Arizona
was completed in 1929.53 With the compact in effect, the Upper Division
States received protection against the potential interstate application of the
doctrine of prior appropriation in the face of rapid downstream development
in California. In turn, California, compliments of the federal reclamation
program, obtained the federal financing and construction of the All American
Canal and Hoover Dam. Arizona, from its perspective, got nothing, although
it was also to eventually become a beneficiary of the storage provided by
Hoover Dam.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act also authorized Arizona, California, and
Nevada to enter into an agreement by which Arizona would receive
2.8 million acre-feet per annum and Nevada 300,000 acre-feet per annum
out of the 7.5 million acre-feet per annum of beneficial consumptive use
allocated to the Lower Basin.54 While attempted, negotiation of this compact
was never successful, with neither California nor Arizona being satisfied
with the allocation suggested by Congress in the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
When negotiations failed, Arizona turned to the U.S. Supreme Court, where
it spent the 1930s futilely arguing a series of three lawsuits filed against
California.55 The first sought to have the Boulder Canyon Project Act
declared unconstitutional, while the third sought a judicial apportionment of
the lower Colorado River. The Court squarely ruled against Arizona in all
three cases. Faced with over 20 years of legislative and legal failures since
the negotiation of the Colorado River Compact, and anxious to win
Congressional support for some reclamation projects of its own, Arizona
finally ratified the compact in 1944.56

In fact, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming had ratified the compact for a
second time prior to the enactment of the Boulder Canyon Act, their second ratifications
having already contained a waiver of the requirement that all seven states affirm the
compact. Thus, only California's and Utah's legislatures had to act in 1929. The states'
second acts of ratification are cited in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 58-9.
53

54
Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 4, 45 Stat. 1058 (1928) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C.A. § 617c (1986)).

Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (McReynolds, J., dissent); Arizona v.
California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934); and Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936).
55

56

20

The act of ratification is cited in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 58.
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Ratification of the compact by Arizona, the nearly concurrent execution of the
Mexican Water Treaty with Mexico in 194457 (which allocated 1.5 million
acre-feet per annum of the Colorado River to Mexico58), and the conclusion of
World War II set the stage for the next chapter in the river's political history.
The preface to this chapter lay in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.
In formulating the act, the Upper Division States had bargained for and
received, in addition to the provisions concerning the ratification of the
Colorado River Compact, authorization for Reclamation:
... to make investigation and public reports of the feasibility of projects for
irrigation, generation of electric power, and other purposes ... for the
purpose ... of formulating a comprehensive scheme of control and the
improvement and utilization of the water of the Colorado River and its
tributaries.59
While initiated in the 1930s, completion of the requisite investigations was
delayed by World War II. When forthcoming in 1946, the inventory of
potential developments in the Colorado River Basin60 pointed out that there

57
Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana Treaty in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 456
[hereinafter Mexican Water Treaty]. The treaty is commonly referred to in this country as
the Mexican Water Treaty. It had been signed only three weeks before the Arizona
legislature ratified the Colorado River Compact, a fact which reinforced Arizona's decision to
bring its recalcitrance to an end. The history of tensions between the United States and
Mexico over the waters of the Rio Grande, Tijuana, and Colorado Rivers, which tensions
dated back to the 1870s, and the history of the negotiation of the treaty, are thoroughly
documented in N. HUNDLEY, DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (1966).

Mexican Water Treaty, art. 10(a). Even though Article III(c) of the Colorado River
Compact of 1922 anticipated a future treaty with Mexico and provided for the delivery of
water to Mexico out of the supplies apportioned to the basin states in the event of a
deficiency, this obligation is one which the basin states have argued should be fulfilled by
the federal government since the flows of the river are seemingly less than was assumed
when the compact was negotiated (supra note 43). Proposals to augment the water supply of
the Colorado River have, however, thus far come to naught. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C.A. § 1512
(1986), which was one of the deals contained in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968,
discussed infra.
58

Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 15, 45 Stat. 1065 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 617n (1986)).
59

60
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE
COLORADO RIVER: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WATER RESOURCES OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN FOR IRRIGATION, POWER
PRODUCTION, AND OTHER BENEFICIAL USES IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA,
COLORADO, NEVADA, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING (1946).
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were more potential projects than water available for development. The
Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), which had prepared the inventory,
took the position that projects could not be selected and development could
not proceed until the Upper Division States agreed on a suballocation of the
water apportioned to the Upper Basin by the Colorado River Compact.61
Given the federal government's requirements, and given Arizona's
ratification of the Colorado River Compact in 1944, the execution of the
Mexican Water Treaty with Mexico in 1944, and the continued rapid growth
in the use of Colorado River water by California, the Upper Division States
(and Arizona62) promptly set about the negotiation of an interstate compact
among themselves. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact63 was
executed in 1948 and ratified by all five signatory states and Congress by the
next year.64
With this new compact in hand, the Upper Division States worked closely
with Reclamation to refine Reclamation's 1946 report into a plan for
development of the Upper Basin. The groundwork for what was to become
the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) was laid in Reclamation's
resulting 1950 report.65 The first bill to authorize the CRSP was introduced
in Congress in 1952.
... It called for a billion-dollar dam-building program with major
reservoirs at Echo Park on the Green River and at Glen Canyon on the
main stream near the Arizona-Utah border. The bill immediately aroused
opposition from southern Californians who viewed any significant
developments on the upper river as threats to their own water uses. More
recent measurements of flow had been calling into question the rosy
forecasts on which the 1922 [Colorado River] compact had been based.

61

Id. at 3.

Arizona, even though a Lower Division State within the meaning of the Colorado
River Compact, also lies partially within the Upper Basin as that term is defined in the
compact. Supra notes 36 and 41. Thus, it received a portion of the beneficial consumptive
use apportioned to the Upper Basin by the compact.
62

63

Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 339.

64
The states' and Congress' acts of ratification are cited in T. WITMER, supra note 36,
at 352.

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT AND PARTICIPATING PROJECTS: UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1950).
65
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Major opposition also emerged nationwide and focused on the Echo Park
reservoir, which would flood the unique and beautiful canyons of
Dinosaur National Monument. The alarm escalated into the biggest battle
over wilderness preservation since John Muir had tried to keep a dam out
of Hetch Hetchy Valley [California] at the turn of the century. The contest
was essentially a civil war in which both sides labeled themselves
"conservationists." While one side campaigned for conservation for use
through dams ..., the other argued for conservation through preservation of
unique wilderness areas. ...66
Proponents of the CRSP eventually removed the Echo Park reservoir from
the legislation and finally won its passage.67 With enactment of the Colorado
River Storage Project Act in 1956,68 the Upper Division States gained the
authorization of four so-called storage units (Glen Canyon Dam, the Aspinall
Unit,69 Flaming Gorge Dam, and Navajo Dam) and of 11 so-called
participating projects, which were primarily for irrigation.70 Further
legislation in 1962 authorized two additional CRSP participating projects and
one non-CRSP project71, while 1964 legislation authorized three more CRSP
participating projects.72

66

Hundley, supra note 34, at 29.

The history surrounding Congressional consideration of the legislation to authorize
the CRSP is, of course, far more extensive than indicated here. For a complete treatment, see
D. MANN, G. WEATHERFORD, & P. NICHOLS, LEGAL-POLITICAL HISTORY OF
WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 1-36
(Lake Powell Research Project Bulletin No. 4, 1974).
67

Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C.A. § 620-620o (1986)).
68

69
This unit was called the Curecanti Unit in the original 1956 legislation. Its name was
subsequently changed to the Aspinall Unit by Pub. L. No. 96-375, § 7, 94 Stat. 1507 (1980).
The unit consists of Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal Dams and Reservoirs.

The 11 participating projects were the Central Utah (initial phase), which consisted of
four units (Jensen, Vernal, Upalco, and Bonneville) that were themselves physically
separate projects, Emery County, Florida, Hammond, La Barge, Lyman, Paonia, Pine River
Extension, Seedskadee, Silt, and Smith Fork.
70

The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and the San Juan-Chama Project were
authorized as CRSP participating projects by the Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76
Stat. 96, while the separate, non-CRSP Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was authorized by the
Act of August 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-590, 76 Stat. 389.
71

The Savery-Pot Hook, Bostwick Park, and Fruitland Mesa participating projects were
authorized by the Act of September 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-568, 78 Stat. 852.
72
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Participating projects received that denomination because they "participate"
in the revenues received from the sale of the hydroelectric energy generated
at Glen Canyon Dam, Flaming Gorge Dam, and the dams of the Aspinall Unit
in that these revenues are used to repay not only the costs allocable to the
hydropower function of those three projects, but also to repay the costs of the
participating units allocable to irrigation which are beyond the ability of
irrigators to repay. This repayment mechanism, which is known as the
Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, was established by section 5 of the
Colorado River Storage Project Act.73
Meanwhile, Arizona, having ratified the Colorado River Compact in 1944,
started working with Reclamation to capture a federal reclamation prize for
itself -- the Central Arizona Project (CAP). A 1947 report by Reclamation
had resurrected this dormant idea and endorsed it as now being economically
justified. However,
... When Arizonans introduced a bill in Congress [in 1948] to authorize the
CAP, they encountered stiff opposition from Californians who argued that
Arizona was attempting to use water that did not belong to the state. ...
[D]issension centered on conflicting interpretations of the 1922 [Colorado
River] compact. The differing claims caused Congress to refuse approval of
the CAP until the two states had resolved their differences. Congress did
not want to invest in a project for which there might be not water.
The news bitterly disappointed Arizonans. While the Upper Basin,
California, and Mexico were moving ahead with their projects, Arizonans
had remained stymied. They believed their only recourse was to appeal
once more to the U.S. Supreme Court.74
Arizona filed its fourth lawsuit against California in the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1952, again seeking judicial apportionment of the Colorado River
Compact's allocation to the Lower Basin. While the Court had refused
Arizona's earlier suit in this regard on jurisdictional grounds and because the
Lower Basin allocation exceeded then current uses,75 this time the Court was
persuaded that Arizona might suffer harm if the dispute with California were
not resolved.

73
Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, § 5, 70 Stat. 107 (1956) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C.A. § 620d (1986)).
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Hundley, supra note 34, at 30-31.

75

Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936).
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In defending against Arizona's suit, California argued for substantially more
than the 4.4 million acre-feet per year provided to it by the Boulder Canyon
Project Act. However, after 11 years of trial and arguments, Arizona
emerged victorious when the Court held, in a 1963 opinion76 which was
implemented by a 1964 decree,77 that, among other things:
(1) Congress may, under its navigation and general welfare powers,
apportion interstate streams by legislation.
(2) By enacting the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress exercised this
power by "apportioning" 4.4 [million acre-feet] to California in the
limitation provision [of the act] and specifying Arizona's and Nevada's
shares [2.8 and .3 million acre-feet, respectively] through the authorization
of a lower basin compact. Furthermore, Congress delegated to the
Secretary of the Interior the power to contract for storage and delivery of
[Boulder Canyon] project waters, and the Secretary then extended [sic]
contracts reflecting the authorized shares.
(3) Federal law controls both the interstate and intrastate distribution of
[Boulder Canyon] project waters, preempting state water law. ...
The opinion demonstrated that the Court prefers congressional allocations
of interstate waters to playing the role of a trial court in complex litigation.
The Court strained to find the federal power to allocate water among states
and that it had been exercised.78
Thus did the Court affirm the power of Congress to apportion the waters of
an interstate stream. The Boulder Canyon Project Act is, however, the only
time that this has occurred.

76
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissent and Harlan, J., joined
by Douglas and Stewart, JJ., dissenting separately).
77

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissent).

78

D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 414-415.
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Having garnered 2.8 million acre-feet per year from the mainstem of the
Colorado River,79 Arizona returned to the halls of Congress to seek anew the
authorization of the CAP. California was, however, incensed at its loss in the
Supreme Court, and the Upper Division States feared, as they always had,
further Lower Basin development. The legislation introduced by the Arizona
delegation was immediately bottled up.
Arizona had to mollify more than California. The concern about the water
supply [of the Colorado River being less than assumed when the 1922
compact was negotiated] had spread to the Upper Basin. If the river flow ...
[was as little] as many now suspected, then the upper states, after fulfilling
their obligation to the Lower Basin, would receive [only] 6.5 million acrefeet, a million acre-feet less than anticipated in the 1922 compact. ...
Worried that such water-supply estimates might later prevent them from
obtaining projects on their own, they tied their fortunes to the Arizona bill.
They agreed to support it but only in exchange for a provision authorizing
five [additional CRSP participating] projects for the Upper Basin -Animas-La Plata, Dolores, Dallas [Creek], West Divide, and San Miguel.
...80
These five projects would all benefit Colorado, with the Animas-La Plata
Project also serving water to New Mexico. In addition, Utah sought the
authorization of the Uintah Unit of the Central Utah Project, this being the
fifth unit of that project, and New Mexico sought the authorization of the
Hooker Dam on the headwaters of the Gila River, which river lies in the
Lower Basin.
A brochure circulated during the legislative debate over the CAP waxed
eloquently about the five Colorado projects -- and illustrates the fervor
brought to the debate by Colorado's water development interests:

Much disputed, depending upon which basin state one is representing, is whether the
Court's opinion in Arizona v. California does or does not stand for the proposition that water
arising in Arizona in the tributaries to the Colorado River (e.g., the Bill Williams, Little
Colorado, and Gila Rivers) is available to Arizona in addition to the 2.8 million acre-feet
allocated to it by Congress from the mainstem. This dispute arises because language in the
opinion, which addressed only the Boulder Canyon Project Act, arguably can be cited as
supporting this result, yet the compact, which the Court did not purport to interpret,
apportions the beneficial consumptive use of the "Colorado River System," which term means
"that portion of the Colorado river and its tributaries within the United States ..." (Art. II(a)).
79

80
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There is a river -- and its name is the Colorado. The streams thereof ...
"shall make glad the city" .... The means through which these streams will
do their gladdening are five reclamation projects in western Colorado: The
Animas-La Plata, the Dolores, the Dallas Creek, the San Miguel and the
West Divide projects. These projects stretch across the Western Slope of
Colorado like the five fingers of a giant hand, trying to conserve for use in
Colorado some of the waters which are allocated to that state. ... In total,
the Fiver Fingers projects will provide about 719 thousand acre-feet of
water annually .... Of this total, 398 thousand acre-feet represent actual
depletion[s] .... Such depletion, in turn, represents only a portion of ...
Colorado's net share of Colorado River water. ... 11 years have gone by
since passage of the CRSP Act which was enacted to permit Upper Basin
States to develop their full share of Colorado River water .... Yet ...
Colorado to date has received authorization for projects under the CRSP
which consume a "grand" total of only 95 thousand acre-feet of water a
year -- much less than has been authorized for any other Upper Basin
State. The Five Fingers projects now stand ready for authorization. ...81
After over four years of legislative maneuvering, the Colorado River Basin
Project Act emerged in 1968.82 It authorized the construction of the CAP for
Arizona,83 as well as the "Five Fingers" projects for Colorado, the Uintah

THE COLORADO RIVER EDUCATIONAL FUND OF DENVER, COLORADO, FIVE
FINGERS PROJECTS (no pagination and undated). This brochure was probably produced
in 1967 during the 90th Congress' consideration of legislation (H.R. 3300 and S. 1242) to
authorize the CAP.
81

82
Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (1968) (codified as
amended in part at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-56 (1986 & Supp. 1997)). The politics and eventual
passage of the Colorado River Basin Project Act were vastly more complicated and
convoluted than is indicated in these few paragraphs. The interested reader can find an
engagingly complete history in H. INGRAM, supra note 3, at 26-115.

Arizona, however, paid a price for the CAP's authorization in that it needed the votes
of the California Congressional delegation to move the bill through Congress. California's
price, among other things, was to get back from Arizona some of what it had lost in the 1963
Arizona v. California ruling. Section 301 of the act provides, in effect, that California's 4.4
million acre-feet has priority over diversions for the CAP in the event of shortages.
Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 301(b), 82 Stat. 887 (1968) (codified
at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1521(b) (1986)).
83
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Unit of the Central Utah Project,84 and the Hooker Dam. Not coincidentally,
the chairman of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in the House of
Representatives, through which the legislation had to pass, was
Congressman Wayne Aspinall, from Colorado's Western Slope.
This act constituted the last major political agreement between the upper
and lower basins over the authorization of federal reclamation projects. The
very language of the statute illustrated the Upper Division States',
particularly Colorado's, concerns about being, as it were, "left behind in the
dust:"
The Secretary [of the Interior] is directed to proceed as nearly as
practicable with the construction of the ... [Five Fingers] participating
Federal reclamation projects concurrently with the construction of the
Central Arizona Project, to the end that such projects shall be completed
not later than the date of the first delivery of water from said Central
Arizona Project.85

The Actual Results
The projects authorized for the benefit of the Lower Division States, from
1928 through 1968, as part of legislative deals with the Upper Division
States have all been completed. Hoover Dam was completed in the mid1930s, the All American Canal was finished in 1942, various diversion works
and other facilities have been completed on the lower mainstem of the river
(e.g., Parker Dam, Davis Dam, and Senator Wash Dam), and the last major
features of the CAP have been completed within the past few years.
To be sure, the CAP that has been built is significantly different in certain
regards than the CAP that was authorized in 1968: some originally
authorized features of the project were deleted, Congress has required that
significant non-federal cost sharing be provided toward the completion of

84
Although authorized, construction of the Uintah Unit was conditioned on the
requirement that a feasibility report first be completed and submitted to the Congress,
together with certification from the Secretary of the Interior "... that, in his judgment, the
benefits of such unit ... will exceed the costs and that such unit is physically and financially
feasible ...." Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 501(a), 82 Stat. 896
(1968). This requirement was then struck by the Congressional Reports Elimination Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-470, § 108(c), 94 Stat. 2239.

Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 501(b), 82 Stat. 897 (1968)
(codified at 43 U.S.C.A. § 620a-1 (1986)).
85

28

The Colorado River Basin: The Agreements and the Results

construction, and portions of the project's water supply have been allocated
to other than the originally contemplated irrigation beneficiaries.86 However,
the CAP, even though altered, is physically capable of delivering a little more
than 2 million acre-feet per year to Arizona from the Colorado River87, as it
was originally contemplated it would do.
In short, the Lower Division States have, for the most part, gotten that for
which they bargained. Indeed, within just the past few years, Arizona,
California, and Nevada have, for the first time, begun consuming an
aggregate of about 7.5 million acre-feet per year from the mainstem of the
Colorado River88 -- a feat made possible almost entirely by federally financed
and constructed projects.
In the Upper Division States, the same result has not obtained. While the
four storage units of the CRSP were constructed, nine of the 25 authorized
CRSP participating projects89 have not been constructed:
• The Pine River Extension project was deauthorized in 1968,90 albeit
with the concurrence of the state in which the project would have been
located.

86

See H. INGRAM, supra note 3, at 123-127.

Full use of the CAP's pumping capacity would require substantial purchases of
electrical energy beyond that which is available to the project under favorable terms from the
federally owned share of the Navajo Generating Station, a coal-fired plant in Arizona. This
fact, when coupled with the economic constraints which the CAP irrigation districts presently
face, makes it likely, in the author's opinion, that annual CAP deliveries will not exceed
about 1.5 million acre-feet for some time to come. Deliveries in 1996 reached nearly 1.2
million acre-feet and are expected to be about the same in 1997. Personal communication
from Tom Burbey, Lower Colorado Region, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to the author (April
29, 1997).
87

88
Consumptive uses (diversions minus return flows to the river) reached 7.5 million
acre-feet for the first time in calendar year 1989. They actually exceeded this limit, due to
"inadvertent overruns," by a slight amount that year and by about 150,000 acre-feet the next
year. While annual fluctuations will occur, consumptive uses are expected to remain near or
at this limit from now on.
89
Counting the Central Utah Project as a single participating project, 21 participating
projects have been authorized (including the originally authorized, but subsequently deauthorized, Pine River Extension). If the Central Utah Project's five authorized units
(Vernal, Jensen, Upalco, Uintah, and Bonneville) are counted as five separate projects, then
there have been 25 authorized participating projects (again including the Pine River
Extension).

Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 501(a), 82 Stat. 897 (1968)
(amending 43 U.S.C.A § 620a)).
90
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• Construction of the La Barge, Savery-Pot Hook, Fruitland Mesa, West
Divide, and San Miguel Projects has been, in the euphemism of the
bureaucracy, "indefinitely deferred."91
• The Animas-La Plata Project, even though it became the cornerstone
of a major 1986 Indian water rights settlement that was subsequently
confirmed in legislation passed by Congress in 1988,92 remains mired
in litigation and controversy, with construction having not yet been
initiated.
• The Uintah and Upalco Units of the Central Utah Project have not
been constructed, although recent legislation allows the Central Utah
Water Conservancy District the opportunity to construct certain
features of these two units.93
Furthermore, Hooker Dam, although it would develop waters of the Lower
Basin, has not been built to New Mexico's benefit.
To add insult to injury in the eyes of some, only two of Colorado's Five
Fingers participating projects, which projects were to have been built
"concurrently" with the construction of the CAP, have even been constructed,
let alone completed "not later than the first date of delivery of water from
the" CAP. Water was first delivered by the CAP in 1985, but the Dolores
Project did not start deliveries until 1987 and the Dallas Creek Project not
until 1990.
Even when construction has been initiated, substantial portions of some
projects have yet to be, and may never be, undertaken.

Furthermore, the withdrawal from the public domain of the lands required for the La
Barge Project was revoked in 1968. Revocation of the withdrawals for the other four projects
is presently pending. See UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 45,
47.
91

Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585,
102 Stat. 2973.
92

93
1992 legislation authorizes appropriations for a Uinta Basin Replacement Project "...
to increase efficiency, enhance beneficial uses, and achieve greater water conservation
within the Uinta Basin ...." Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Titles
II-VI, § 203, 106 Stat. 4612 (1992). However, the Uintah and Upalco Units were not deauthorized. The Central Utah Water Conservancy District has moved ahead with planning
for a project which would replace the former Upalco Unit, which replacement project
encompasses features addressed by section 203, as well as other facilities from the unit as
originally conceived.
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• In the Central Utah Project, only portions of the originally
contemplated Jensen Unit have been constructed. While the major
storage reservoir for the Bonneville Unit was completed in 1992, the
originally envisioned scope of the unit and the project yield allocated to
irrigation were significantly reduced as the price of obtaining
legislation to increase the authorized cost ceiling for the unit when
that legislation encountered stiff environmental opposition both from
within and outside of Utah.94 Construction has yet to be completed on
the remaining authorized features of the unit.
• The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project's delivery system, which receives
water from Navajo Dam and Reservoir, has been under construction
for years on end, but the system has been extended thus far to only
seven of the 11 blocks of land that are to be brought under cultivation.
Construction is continuing at this time on the facilities required for the
eight block.
• While the Fontenelle Dam and Reservoir of the Seedskadee
participating project were constructed on the Green River in Wyoming,
the irrigation delivery system for which the project called never was
built.
Finally, even if constructed, the originally intended benefits of some projects
in the Upper Division States are not being, or may not be, realized. This has
occurred principally because of efforts required by law, or undertaken in the
discretion of federal agencies, to address environmental concerns not
foreseen at the time the historical deals were put together. Foremost among
these are probably the requirements of the Endangered Species Act95 with
respect to threatened and endangered fish species native to the Colorado
River and its tributaries. Since these matters are being addressed at some
length in the basin study of the Colorado River being done for the Western
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission by another author, a few brief
examples will suffice for the purposes of this paper.
In terms of the impacts of endangered fish species, a good example would be
the situation at Ruedi Reservoir, which is the western Colorado storage
feature of the transcontinental Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. The full yield of
this reservoir may not be available for beneficial consumptive use in the

Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Titles II-VI, 106 Stat. 4605
(1992).
94

95

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-43 (1985 & Supp. 1997).
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future due to instream flow requirements for endangered fish species
downstream from the reservoir.96 On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that the oil shale industry and other growth upon which the
need for this reservoir was premised have not developed as anticipated and
the contemporary use of a portion of the reservoir's yield for instream flows
has been negotiated (some would say under duress) by the State of Colorado
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Reductions in project yield for originally intended irrigation uses have also
occurred. One example would be the reduction in irrigation supplies from the
Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project, referred to above. Another
example would be the recent controversies at the Dolores Project in Colorado.
Here, environmental interests desire to devote more of the reservoir's yield,
potentially at the expense of the water available for irrigation and municipal
uses, to sustaining the coldwater trout fishery below McPhee Dam than was
originally contemplated, which fishery largely did not exist prior to the
construction of the dam.
Finally, there are the on-going debates among numerous interests concerning
many, many issues about the overall operation of the major reservoirs in the
Colorado River System. While these are beyond the scope of the historical
inquiry being made in this paper, suffice it to say that from the perspective of
Upper Basin water development interests, the CRSP storage units, especially
Glen Canyon Dam, were intended to assist the Upper Division States in
meeting their delivery obligations at Lee Ferry so that they were not
prevented from fully utilizing the consumptive use apportioned to them by
the Colorado River Compact. Yet, current events threaten, in the eyes of
many, otherwise. The tip of the iceberg has been the Grand Canyon
Protection Act of 1992,97 which has required the development of revised
operating criteria for Glen Canyon Dam, which revisions were driven by
various environmental concerns.98
In summary, upper basin water development interests often believe not only
that they have been denied the federal water projects for which they
96

UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 44.

97

Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Title XVIII, 106 Stat.

4669.

98
A very brief summary of the studies, environmental impact statement, and the
October, 1996, record of decision by the Secretary of the Interior concerning the selection of
revised operating criteria for Glen Canyon Dam may be found in UPPER COLORADO
RIVER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 32-39.
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bargained, but that they are now also suffering the loss of the benefits which
were to have been provided by the projects that have been constructed.
Furthermore, they often have a sense that this loss of intended benefits is
being visited only upon the Upper Division States, but not the Lower Division
States.99 Whatever the reality may be, the perception that the upper basin is
being treated inequitably by the federal establishment continues to drive, at
least in part, certain of the upper basin/lower basin issues of today.

The Missouri River Basin: The Agreements and the Results
Introduction
The headwaters of the Missouri River lie in the Rocky Mountains of western
Montana and northwestern Wyoming. The river's basin drains ten states -portions of those two states and of Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and
North Dakota; a very small area in the extreme southwestern corner of
Minnesota; nearly all of South Dakota; and the entirety of Nebraska.
The Missouri River Basin contrasts with the Colorado River Basin in two
significant regards. First, while the Colorado River Basin has a uniformly
arid climate, the Missouri River watershed extends from the arid climate of
the Great Plains in the western and northern portions of the basin to the
more humid climate found in Iowa, Missouri, and the eastern portions of
Kansas and Nebraska. Thus, irrigation is needed to sustain crop production
in the arid portion of the basin (Montana, the Dakotas, Wyoming, Colorado,
western Nebraska, and western Kansas), but not in the eastern portion of
the basin where rainfall is more plentiful and uniform.

99
This was an argument frequently heard during the 1980s and early 1990s with
respect to issues associated with endangered fish species, as these issues were first pressed
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service starting in 1984 in the Upper Basin. Now, however, the
Lower Basin finds itself in the throws of preparing a multi-species habitat conservation
program, just as the Upper Division States negotiated an Upper Basin Recovery
Implementation Program in 1988 and a separate endangered fish program for the San Juan
River Basin which was initiated in 1992. These matters are addressed in the basin study of
the Colorado River which is being prepared for the Commission.
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Second, the natural, undepleted flows of the Missouri River are more than
four times greater than those of the Colorado River.100 For this and other
reasons, navigation on the lower Missouri has been a major factor in the
political history of this basin's development,101 unlike that of the Colorado.
On the other hand, both the lower Colorado and the lower Missouri have
been prone to devastating floods. To this extent, the history of upstreamdownstream conflicts in both basins share the attribute that lower basin
interests in both basins have been desirous of obtaining flood control
protection.
Unlike the Colorado River, the waters of the Missouri River have not been
apportioned on an interstate basis (by compact, decree of the U.S. Supreme
Court, or legislation), although some tributaries are the subject of Court
decrees or interstate compacts.102 While the Missouri has thus avoided the

At the mouth of the Missouri River, undepleted natural flows are estimated to
average about 65 million acre-feet annually. J. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER
OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 14 (1994). This
contrasts with average annual virgin flows on the Colorado River of about 15 million acrefeet at Lee Ferry.
100

101
For a complete history of navigation on the Missouri River, see J. FERRELL,
SOUNDINGS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MISSOURI RIVER NAVIGATION
PROJECT (1996).

The Belle Fourche, South Platte, Republican, Yellowstone, and Niobrara Rivers are
the subject of interstate compacts executed between, respectively, South Dakota and
Wyoming in 1943; Colorado and Nebraska in 1923; Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska in
1942; Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming in 1950, and Wyoming and Nebraska in 1962.
The first four compacts may be found in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 33, 319, 260, and 361,
respectively. The Upper Niobrara River Compact may be found in the act of Congress
ratifying the same. Act of August 4, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969). In addition,
the Laramie River has been apportioned between Colorado and Wyoming by decree of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Wyoming v. Colorado, supra note 14, and the North Platte River has
been apportioned between Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., and Rutledge, J., dissenting). Litigation is pending at this
time before the Court concerning its previous decree on the North Platte River. Nebraska v.
Wyoming, No. 108, Original.
102

The United States and Canada have also entered into a treaty which governs, in
general, all boundary waters between the two countries and which, in Article VI, apportions
the waters of the Milk River, a small tributary which arises in Montana, flows into Canada,
and then returns to Montana and thence to the Missouri River. Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 in T. WITMER, supra note 36, at 381. While the treaty did not play a role in the
political agreements of the 1940s which led to the Pick-Sloan Plan, discussed infra, Canada's
assertions that the treaty would be violated by importation of Missouri River waters into the
Red River Basin in northeastern North Dakota eventually played a significant role in the
demise of the Garrison Diversion Unit of the Pick-Sloan Plan.
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lengthy interstate litigation that is the hallmark of the Colorado, the political
history of water resources development in the Missouri River Basin has been
no less complicated than that of the Colorado River Basin.
For lack of an interstate compact or court decree, there is no legal
designation of upper basin and lower basin states in the Missouri River
Basin. Montana, the two Dakotas, Wyoming, and Colorado have clearly seen
themselves as upper basin states, with their historic interests having been in
the irrigation benefits to be derived from the development of the basin's
waters. Iowa and Missouri have always perceived themselves as lower basin
states whose vested interests lie in flood control, navigation, and river
regulation to maintain adequate depths for the water intakes which their
cities have in the Missouri River. Nebraska and Kansas, since they both
border the lower mainstem of the river on their eastern boundaries yet
extend westward to the arid climate of the Great Plains, have had an interest
both in irrigation on the one hand and flood control and navigation on the
other.

The Historical Agreements 103
Congress appropriated monies for navigation improvements on the lower
Missouri as early as 1832, when a program for the removal of snags
originally authorized for the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers was expanded to
the Missouri.104 In 1910, Congress authorized a six foot (in depth) navigation
channel from the mouth of the river up to Kansas City. Extension of this
channel up to Sioux City, Iowa, was authorized in 1927. Furthermore, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), which has jurisdiction over the
nation's public works projects for navigation and flood control, was also
authorized at that time to study the feasibility of a nine foot channel from the
mouth of the Missouri to Kansas City.105

This summary is drawn from J. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM 1-73
(1993) unless noted to the contrary. Other major works which document the history of the
agreements concerning federal water resources development in the Missouri River Basin are
J. THORSON, supra note 100; M. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN
PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DETERMINATION (Illinois
Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 35, 1955); and Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.
DAK. L. REV. 347 (1985).
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Guhin, supra note 103, at 351.
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J. FERRELL, supra note 103, at 175-76.
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Meanwhile, irrigation interests had obtained some benefits from the federal
reclamation program with a variety of projects constructed on various
tributaries in the western portion of the basin. The first of these were
authorized by the Secretary of the Interior in 1903 under the authority of the
then newly enacted Reclamation Act of 1902.106
Initially, upper basin irrigation interests, supported by Reclamation, and
lower basin flood control and navigation interests, supported by the Corps,
had gone their separate ways. However, this changed in the late 1930s, as
the upper and lower basins started coming into conflict over the development
and utilization of the waters of the basin. This conflict, as with the conflicts
in the Colorado River Basin, eventually played out in the form of
Congressional authorizing legislation which memorialized a political
agreement between upstream and downstream interests.
Before recounting these conflicts and the eventual compromises between
upper and lower basin interests, it is important to describe the times in
which they arose. First, a prolonged and widespread drought in the 1930s
and the Depression had two major negative effects on the basin: values of
farm buildings and lands declined dramatically and there were significant
decreases in the farm population due to out migration. Second, the advent of
World War II only exacerbated the out migration, leading demographers to
conclude in 1943 "that about 600,000 persons would be seeking work or
government assistance during the postwar period" in the Great Plains states
of Montana, Wyoming, the two Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas.107
Third, decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1940 and 1941 were very
troubling to upper basin irrigation interests, just as decisions of the Court
two decades earlier had brought fear to the hearts of upper basin water
development interests in the Colorado River Basin.
... No new basic principles of national water law had been announced by
the Court's majority opinions in ... United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Company [311 U.S. 377 (1940)] ... and ... Oklahoma v. Atkinson
[313 U.S. 508 (1941)]. In these decisions, however, the Court asserted that

Section 4 of the Act gave the Secretary the authority, "Upon the determination ... [by
him] that any irrigation project is practicable," to undertake the construction of the same.
Congressional authorization of individual projects was not, at the time, required.
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 4, 32 Stat. 389 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 419,
461 (1986)).
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107
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whenever the constitutional powers of the federal government and those of
a state conflicted, the latter must yield. "... [T]he exercise of the granted
power of Congress to regulate interstate waters may be aided by
appropriate and needful control of activities and agencies which, though
intrastate, affect that commerce."
Upper Missouri basin interests feared that the federal government might
use this broad activist interpretation of the commerce clause to impair
rights acquired under state laws. ... [W]esterners were concerned that the
federal government might claim unappropriated water under the
navigation powers. ...108
Fourth, the notion of comprehensive and integrated river basin development
emerged as a guiding principle of federal water policy in the 1930s. While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to recount the history of the
"comprehensive" planning efforts undertaken by the federal water agencies
nationwide in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, it is important to understand that
debates during this period about the development of the Missouri River
Basin's water resources were imbued with an urgent sense of effecting
national social and economic purposes and experimenting with various
models of river basin "governance."109
Finally, when the United States entered World War II, there were a large
number of public works projects for irrigation, flood control, navigation, and
hydropower generation which had been authorized. However, work on these
projects was suspended, or not initiated, unless their completion would
contribute to the war effort.
Given the impacts of the 1930s drought on agriculture, the out migration
caused by the Depression and the war, and the need to provide jobs for
returning soldiers at war's end, upper and lower basin interests alike, as well
as government planners and members of Congress, began as early as 1942 to
look ahead to reinstituting the development of federal water projects after
the war as a means of providing jobs and economic stability for the Missouri
River Basin. In order to achieve this shared goal, upper and lower basin
interests understood the need to cooperate politically.
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Id. at 21-22. Footnote omitted.

109
For example, the grand experiment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
emerged from this period. Indeed, legislation to create a Missouri Valley Authority modeled
after the TVA was also considered by Congress in the late 1930s and early 1940s, but never
enacted. Id. at 73-86.
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Recognizing the perceived urgency and the "joint community interest"
throughout the basin, South Dakota Governor Merrill Q. Sharpe pointed
out that the special interests would "have a much better opportunity to
obtain development for their mutual benefit if they all acted together under
the direction of some kind of steering or executive or liaison committee."
The development advocates foresaw the political advantages of pooling
efforts to request plan authorization and appropriations from Congress.
... Although the states had varying interests in the basin's water resources,
they constituted a powerful political network.110
The result was the formation of the Missouri River States Committee in May
of 1943 for the purpose of promoting the states' joint interests in the
comprehensive and integrated development of the water resources of the
basin. This much the upper and lower basin interests could agree upon. But,
the devil is always in the details.
The first detail dated back to 1933, when President Roosevelt ordered the
construction of the Ft. Peck Project on the Missouri River in eastern
Montana. Ft. Peck Reservoir, with a current capacity of nearly 19 million
acre-feet, was the first major storage reservoir built on the Missouri
mainstem.
The Fort Peck project was unique. It was begun in the Depression year
1933 by authority of President ... Roosevelt rather than through the normal
congressional authorization process. The project was to provide jobs in an
area of high unemployment and severe economic depression. Roosevelt's
authority to order the dam built was vested in the National Industrial
Recovery Act of ... 1934. Title II ..., "with a view to increasing employment
quickly," gave the President the power to construct public-works projects.
... [T]he President was constrained by the proviso "That no river or harbor
improvements shall be carried out unless they shall have ... been adopted
by the Congress or are recommended by the ... [Corps]." ... [The Corps] had
recommended on 30 September 1933 that a dam be built across the
Missouri at the Fort Peck project site. On 14 October, Roosevelt approved
[the Fort Peck project] ....
... Its immediate purpose was to create jobs, but its long-term function was
to assure an adequate minimum flow for navigation in the 795 miles of
river channel below Sioux City. Irrigation was not among its purposes,
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despite its western location and although the area was suffering from an
extended drought. ...111
Upper basin interests contested the assertion that Ft. Peck's primary
purpose was to control river flows to the benefit of the six foot navigation
channel over 1,000 miles downstream in the lower Missouri River.
Irrigation advocates pointed out that the first three Public Works
Administration allocations of money for the Fort Peck project were "for the
construction of a dam at Fort Peck for water conservation and control of
flow for navigation." Upper basin interests contended that the money
would not have been allocated at that time had the words "for water
conservation" not been included. However, the phrase was dropped when
legislation [to add hydropower facilities] for the Fort Peck Dam was
submitted to Congress [and enacted in 1938].112
The second detail concerned the Corps' second and expanded plan for the
comprehensive development of the basin. The Corps' first comprehensive
plan for the Missouri River Basin had been embraced by Congress in 1938. It
emphasized flood control features for the benefit of the lower mainstem
states. However, it was not based on the construction of major upstream
flood control reservoirs on the mainstem, but rather looked to levees, dikes,
and relatively small flood control reservoirs on tributaries to the lower
mainstem of the river.
The Corps' second plan, which came to be known as the Pick Plan after
Colonel Lewis A. Pick, the Division Engineer of the Corps' Missouri River
Division, took a different approach than its 1938 plan. In May of 1943, at a
Congressional hearing which had been prompted by major floods on the
Missouri in 1942 and 1943, and in a meeting of basinwide interests a week
later,113 Colonel Pick:
... asserted that the program authorized in the prewar period [i.e., the
Corps' 1938 plan] could not provide the necessary [flood control]
protection. He stressed "comprehensive ultimate development," by which he
meant storing behind big dams similar to Fort Peck as much water as
possible .... Pick rejected any emphasis on traditional flood control
111

Id. at 5-6.
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Id. at 5. Footnote omitted.
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This was the meeting at which the Missouri River States Committee was formed.
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measures, such as cutoffs, and levees, until a comprehensive plan for dams
was in place. ... And he stated boldly to the state delegates in Omaha that
"we must consider other water uses in connection with flood control."114
Pick's concept, when fleshed out into a basinwide plan, called for the
construction of four major dams and a fifth smaller dam on the mainstem in
North and South Dakota with a total storage capacity of about 35 million
acre-feet, and two major dams in the Yellowstone River Basin in Montana
and Wyoming with a total capacity of about 5.7 million acre-feet. Ft. Peck
would have continued to be devoted to navigation and flood control. The Pick
Plan, which was only a few pages long, emphasized flood control and made no
explicit provision for irrigation. However, the Corps stressed that it was a
plan which "... provided a 'flexible basis' for securing the necessary storage
and obtaining the full multiple-purpose use of the basin's water."115
The third detail involved Reclamation getting into the comprehensive
planning business in 1939 when it was authorized to develop plans for the
conservation and use of the waters of the Missouri River Basin and to
allocate the construction costs of reclamation projects to flood control and
navigation to the extent that those purposes were served by a project.116
Under this authority, Reclamation prepared a basinwide plan which
addressed both mainstem flood control needs and the expansion of irrigated
agriculture. This plan came to be known as the Sloan Plan, after its primary
author, William Glenn Sloan, then Assistant Regional Director of
Reclamation's Billings, Montana, office.
The Sloan Plan called for two major dams and one minor one on the
mainstem of the river in the Dakotas totaling about 25 million acre-feet. It
provided for 83 irrigation reservoirs on various tributaries, with a total
storage capacity of approximately 14.5 million acre-feet. It even dared to
propose diverting and consuming water from Ft. Peck Reservoir for irrigation
purposes. Total irrigated acreage under this plan came to about 4.7 million
acres, about 1.4 million of which would be outside of the Missouri River
Basin in northeastern North Dakota.
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J. FERRELL, supra note 103, at 10. Footnotes omitted.
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Id. at 16. Footnote omitted.

Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(b), 53 Stat. 1193 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 485h(b) (1986)).
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The fourth detail which brought upper and lower basin interests into conflict
was the desire of the lower mainstem states to deepen and widen the
navigation channel in the lower mainstem of the Missouri -- from six to nine
feet in depth and from 200 to 300 feet in width. In the view of the
Commissioner of Reclamation, "... the requirements of a nine-foot-deep
channel would 'permit no additional irrigation development at all' in the
upper basin"117 because the capacity of such a channel would require that
upstream consumption be foregone in order to leave flows in the river. For
their part, the governors of the upper basin states observed "... that 'the use
in perpetuity of 32,000 or 35,000 cubic feet per second [for the navigation
channel] out of an average flow of 37,600' was neither the most economic nor
the most beneficial use of water."118
Such proposals had been broached by Congress in 1939 and 1941, but not
enacted. Legislation had again been introduced in 1943 to authorize
expansion of the channel. This proposed legislation, in combination with the
1940 and 1941 rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court noted above, caused great
consternation among the upper basin states.
Thus was the stage set for Congress to consider, in 1943-45, a series of
legislative measures through which upper and lower basin water
development interests would assert their respective "claims" to the benefits
of federal water development programs and policies. The political agreement
that was eventually forged emerged from the legislative process imbedded in
two different statutes -- the Flood Control Act of 1944119 and the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1945.120
Upper basin water development interests had two principal legislative goals.
First, they wanted any authorization of basinwide development to include the
reclamation projects which they desired. Second, they wanted Congressional
protection for their contemplated upstream consumptive uses as against the
physical demands and the potentially superior legal claim of the downstream
federal navigation improvements undertaken pursuant to the power of the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution -- particularly if the navigation
channel was to be enlarged.

117

J. FERRELL, supra note 103, at 25.
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Id. at 26. Footnote omitted.
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Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
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Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10.
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The first goal was achieved, after much maneuvering during 1943 and 1944
between the Corps and Reclamation and the interests which they
represented, in the merger of the separate Pick and Sloan Plans into a single
Pick-Sloan Plan in October of 1944.121 The Pick-Sloan Plan at last, and in
keeping with the tenor of the times, provided for the "comprehensive
ultimate development" of the basin. Not coincidentally, it also represented a
comprehensive political solution to the demands of competing interests.
The Pick-Sloan Plan called for five mainstem dams, from downstream to
upstream, as follows:
Gavins Point, located immediately above Yankton, South Dakota, was in
the Pick Plan.
Ft. Randall was smaller than in the Corps' plan. The dam is located just
above the Nebraska-South Dakota stateline.
Big Bend was in the Sloan Plan. It is located immediately upstream from
Ft. Randall's upper end and backs water up to Pierre, South Dakota.
Oahe was in both the Pick and Sloan Plans. The dam is located upstream
from Pierre. The reservoir extends up to Bismarck, North Dakota.
Garrison was recommended in the Pick Plan. It is located above Stanton,
North Dakota, and creates a reservoir that extends almost to the
Montana stateline.
These projects, along with the previously constructed Ft. Peck Reservoir,
would provide system-wide storage122 for flood control, navigation releases,
hydropower generation, and irrigation and municipal and industrial water
supply needs.
On the western tributaries in the upper basin states, the Pick-Sloan Plan
called for the projects for which irrigation interests had long strived. With
but minor variations, the elements of the Sloan Plan were retained, although
the two large reservoirs proposed in the Corps' plan for the Yellowstone
River Basin were deleted. Furthermore, as a precursor to the Colorado River
Storage Project Act's authorization of "participating projects" in 1956, the
Pick-Sloan Plan contemplated that construction costs allocable to irrigation
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S. DOC. NO. 247, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (1944).

As actually constructed, the six mainstem reservoirs have a current total capacity of
about 73.5 million acre-feet (MAF), as follows: Gavins Point, .5 MAF; Ft. Randall, 5.5 MAF;
Big Bend, 1.9 MAF; Oahe, 23.1 MAF; Garrison, nearly 24 MAF; and Ft. Peck, about 19 MAF.
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purposes which proved to be beyond the ability of irrigators to pay would be
repaid by those who purchased power generated by the Pick-Sloan Plan's
projects.123
Water resources development in the lower Missouri had been addressed only
in the Pick Plan. These features were retained. They included expansion of
previously authorized flood control reservoirs on small tributaries, levees,
and other flood protection works.
While the Pick and Sloan Plans were being spliced together during 1944,
upper basin water development interests were also working to achieve their
second goal, which they viewed as being as important as the authorization of
the Pick-Sloan Plan.
... The issues involved fundamental principles of law, not merely
correlation of federal agency plans [i.e., the Pick and Sloan Plans]. As
expressed by a consumptive-use advocate:
"water rights and the local control and jurisdiction over these rights
represent a sacred heritage which has been handed down to us by our
emigrant forefathers .... We of the present generation in the [West] do
not propose to give up these rights nor the local control and jurisdiction
over them to a federal bureaucracy without a fight."
In previous litigation [i.e., the 1940 and 1940 U.S. Supreme Court cases],
the federal jurisdiction had prevailed. A Montana lawyer termed the result
"the creeping commerce clause."

For the purposes of this paper, this generalization will suffice. However, the author
wishes to acknowledge that there are subtle, but important, differences between the use and
availability of hydropower revenues for repayment of costs allocable to irrigation, and
between methods of allocating costs to irrigation purposes, under the Colorado River Storage
Project Act's Upper Colorado River Basin Fund and the "ultimate development" concept of
the Pick-Sloan Plan. Furthermore, as actually enacted into law, aid to irrigation from
hydropower revenues is available to an irrigation project under the Pick-Sloan Plan only if it
was specifically so authorized for a given project, whereas all CRSP participating projects
automatically receive the benefits of hydropower's aid to irrigation. A very brief summary of
how the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund works may be found in Colorado Water
Conservation Board, Water Project Funding and the Basin Funds (February 20, 1981)
(unpublished paper available in the Board's Denver office and in the author's personal files).
The history and workings of the "ultimate development" concept under the Pick-Sloan Plan
are thoroughly detailed in Guhin, supra note 103, at 366-383, 436-450. For the latest
chapter on cost allocation issues under the Pick-Sloan Plan's ultimate development concept,
see GREAT PLAINS REGION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT OF THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE
HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER AND POWER (1997).
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Clifford Stone [Director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board]
explained the debate ... [thusly]:
"Where the waters of a river system are needed to maintain navigable
capacities under a federally authorized system of navigation works,
there results the imposition of complete centralized federal control. In
such a situation the state laws are not questioned, but they are
effectively rendered impotent."124
The protection which the upper basin irrigation interests sought against "the
creeping commerce clause" was statutory language which would subordinate
the use of the waters of the Missouri for federal navigation projects to
upstream consumptive uses for irrigation undertaken in accordance with
state water law.
They had to address two different bills. One was a bill to authorize
navigation and harbor projects. This bill contained the proposed
authorization for the enlarged navigation channel in the lower mainstem.
The second bill would authorize flood control projects. It was the legislative
vehicle by which the Pick Plan was first taken up, independent of the Sloan
Plan. Both bills were proceeding through Congress during 1944, although in
different houses and different committees of a house at any given time.
The language which the upper basin states eventually succeeded in having
enacted is known as the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment.125 Senator
Joseph C. O'Mahoney was from Wyoming and Senator Eugene Donald
Milliken was from Colorado. As is typical of such legislative provisions, it
underwent several revisions over the course of 1944 before being adopted.
The Pick-Sloan Plan and the agreed upon protective language were
incorporated into the Flood Control Act of 1944. The authorizing language
for the Pick-Sloan Plan126 merely provides that:
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J. FERRELL, supra note 103, at 38. Footnotes omitted.

For an extensive legal analysis of the effect of the amendment, perhaps colored some
by an upper basin point of view, see Guhin, supra note 103, at 383-410.
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At the time it was authorized, the features of the Pick-Sloan Plan were typically
referred to simply as the Missouri River Basin development program. The authorizing
legislation itself did not give a formal name to the program. In 1970, Congress formally
designated it as the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program. Act of Dec. 24, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-576, 84 Stat. 1541.
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The general comprehensive plans set forth in ... [the Pick-Sloan Plan] are
hereby authorized and shall be prosecuted by the War Department [i.e., the
Corps] and the Department of the Interior [i.e., Reclamation] as speedily as
may be consistent with budgetary requirements.127
The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment provides that:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation and maintenance
of such works herein authorized for construction, of water arising in States
lying wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian shall be only
such use as does not conflict with any beneficial consumptive use, present
or future, in States lying wholly or partly west of the ninety-eight
meridian, of such waters for domestic, municipal, stock water, irrigation,
mining, or industrial purposes.128
For a variety of reasons, the separate rivers and harbors bill failed to pass
during 1944 and had to be taken up when the new Congress reconvened in
1945. It quickly passed, with the nine foot navigation channel authorized
from Sioux City to the mouth129 and the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment
also included in it.130

The Actual Results
As in the Colorado River Basin, the lower mainstem states in the Missouri
River Basin have essentially received what they bargained for. The five
additional mainstem reservoirs were constructed within just 20 years of
authorization, yielding regulation of flows for flood control, navigation, and
maintenance of river depths beneficial to municipal water supply intakes on
the lower mainstem. In addition, the nine foot navigation channel sought by
the lower basin states is in place. Finally, most of the levee improvements
and other river works authorized for the lower mainstem have been
constructed.
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Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665 , § 9(a), 58 Stat. 891.
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Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, § 1(b), 58 Stat. 887.
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Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 19.
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Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 1(b), 59 Stat. 11.
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With respect to navigation, the storage and river regulation afforded by the
mainstem reservoirs has enabled the Corps to establish a navigation season
that generally has been seven or eight months long.131 However, commercial
shipments on the waterway, measured both in tons and ton-miles, have
never achieved the volumes originally projected. Furthermore, shipments
peaked in the late 1970s132 and have generally declined since then due to a
variety of factors.
From an upper basin perspective, the Pick-Sloan Plan has not been a success.
The Dakotas and Montana have seen over 1.65 million acres of land
inundated by the six mainstem reservoirs,133 much of it fertile bottomlands,
yet these reservoirs provide benefits mostly to the lower basin. Furthermore,
the upper basin states have received less than ten percent of the promised
full service irrigation acreage. The other states have not fared much better
(see Table 1). Furthermore, Congress in effect deauthorized all irrigation
projects under the Pick-Sloan Plan not under construction in 1964 when it
Table 1.—Irrigation development134
(full service acres)
State

Planned

Developed

Percent

Colorado
Kansas
Nebraska
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Wyoming

101,280
193,335
989,445
967,130
1,266,440
961,210
281,560

0
65,798
252,930
45,582
10,344
71,929
71,773

0
34.0
25.5
4.7
.8
7.5
25.5

Totals

4,760,400

518,356

10.8

required that monies authorized by the Act of August 14, 1964, for the
prosecution of the Pick-Sloan Plan could not be used for any unit of the plan,
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Personal communication from George St. George, Great Plains Region, U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, to the author (February 28, 1997).
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even though included in the original 1944 authorization, unless such unit
was thereafter reauthorized by an act of Congress.135
It is also important to note that about 350,000 acres of the lands which were
inundated on the mainstem were located on Indian reservations, included
prime agricultural lands, and required the relocation of more than 900 Indian
families.136 Yet, in the judgment of one commentator, the benefits received
by the Indian Tribes from the Pick-Sloan Plan "have been nominal."137
While the hydropower plant capacity actually developed by the Corps and
Reclamation is 220 percent of what was planned -- 2,535,000 kilowatts as
compared to 1,153,267 kilowatts138 -- upper basin irrigation interests have
not received nearly as great a benefit as they sought in the form of cheap
hydropower for the pumping of project water or hydropower revenues
assisting with the repayment of irrigation projects simply because so few of
the originally contemplated irrigation projects have been built.139 On the
other hand, this source of relatively inexpensive hydroelectric power has, in
general, benefitted other customers (rural electric cooperatives and
municipal utilities) in the upper basin states, as well as in the lower basin
states.140
Although they have received far less from the Pick-Sloan Plan than originally
contemplated, the upper basin states have been able to make some
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Act of August 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-442, 78 Stat. 446.
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J. THORSON, supra note 100, at 83; and GREAT PLAINS REGION, U.S. BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, supra note 123, at 17.
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80-83.
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For irrigation projects which have been built, the aid to irrigation from hydropower
had, as of 1987, amounted to nearly $307 million. J. THORSON, supra note 100, at 79.

Power generated by the Pick-Sloan facilities is marketed by the Western Area Power
Administration (Western). As measured by Western's firm energy sales in federal fiscal
years 1995 and 1996, the biggest users of Pick-Sloan hydroelectric power were customers in
Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, where sales by
state exceeded 1 billion Kwh each (in Colorado's case this includes some power from nonPick-Sloan facilities, such as Reclamation's Colorado-Big Thompson Project, which Western
markets as well). Missouri was the only state not having customers to whom firm energy is
delivered, but there are utilities in Missouri which purchase non-firm energy from Western.
WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, APPENDIX TO THE 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT 93, 126 (1997).
140
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adjustments to their benefit. First, North and South Dakota have sought in
recent years to benefit from the water supplies developed by the mainstem
reservoirs in ways not even contemplated 50 years ago. This has come about
through the authorization of new federal projects for rural domestic water
supply purposes since 1980, which authorizations were sought and supported
by the states when they realized that additional irrigation projects were
unlikely to be forthcoming. As a result of these authorizations, the WEB
Project141 in South Dakota has been completed at a cost of $113.5 million142
and three other projects are under construction. Table 2 summarizes how
much federal money has been expended on these three projects to date.
Table 2.—Rural water development projects143
Project
Garrison
Diversion144

Indexed authorization
145

$222,195,000

Approximate amount spent
(9/30/96)
$143,319,000

The WEB Rural Water Development Project, South Dakota, was initially authorized
by section 9 of the Rural Development Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-355, § 9, 94 Stat.
1175. The act authorized an initial appropriation to the Secretary of the Interior of $1.9
million, with a further authorization of $68.1 million if, and only if, the Oahe Unit of the
Pick-Sloan Plan, in South Dakota, was deauthorized by September 30, 1981. The
authorization of the $68.1 million expired when such deauthorizing legislation was not
enacted. However, 1982 legislation did deauthorized the Oahe Unit and reauthorized the
WEB Project. Act of Sept. 30, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-273, 96 Stat. 1181.
141

Personal communication from Mike Whittington, Great Plains Region, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, to the author (March 12, 1997).
142

Dollar figures in this table were provided by the Bureau of Reclamation. Id., and
telephone interview with Roger Schlosser, Great Plains Region, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(May 7, 1997).
143

Authorization to construct municipal, rural, and industrial water systems as features
of the Garrison Diversion Unit "to serve areas throughout" North Dakota and "to meet the
economic, public health and environmental needs of the Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and
Fort Totten Indian Reservations" was provided by section 5 of the Garrison Diversion Unit
Reformulation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-294 § 5, 100 Stat. 422.
144

The original authorization for the North Dakota system was $200 million, while that
for the systems for the three Indian reservations was $20 million. Garrison Diversion Unit
Reformulation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-294, § 8, 100 Stat. 424. Indexing was
subsequently provided for the authorizations for the Indian reservations, but not the North
Dakota system. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575 § 1701, 106 Stat. 4669.
145

48

The Missouri River Basin: The Agreements and the Results

Mid Dakota146

$132,965,000

$23,739,000

Mni Wiconi147

$278,976,000

$53,793,000

Perhaps more importantly, flatwater recreation on the six mainstem
reservoirs, while treated as an incidental purpose at the time the Pick-Sloan
Plan was authorized, has proved to be substantial.
... [I]n 1992, public recreational use at the main stem reservoirs alone
amounted to 49.5 million visitor hours. In some areas of upper basin
states, recreation has become perhaps the primary benefit local residents
have obtained from the Pick-Sloan Plan ....148
In turn, the upper basin states have come to have a strong interest in overall
system operations, as flood control targets (i.e., the amount of space to be left
vacant in order to store incoming flood flows) and drawdowns of the
mainstem reservoirs in order to maintain downstream navigation can have
adverse impacts on this burgeoning, upper basin economic activity.
Furthermore, as is typical of water management operations in this day and
age, there are many environmental issues associated with the use and
operation of existing project facilities and the water which they
development.149
Indeed, the distribution between upper and lower basins, and between
economic and environmental interests, of benefits derived from how the
mainstem system of reservoirs is, or could be, operated has become the
driving issue of the past 10 to 15 years between the basins, particularly with
the occurrence of a six year drought starting in 1987 that depleted mainstem
storage to a record low in 1991. Mainstem reservoir operation issues have
spawned substantial litigation, a still on-going review by the Corps of
The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to make grants and loans to the MidDakota Rural Water System, Inc., a non-profit corporation, for the construction of its system
by section 1903 of the Mid-Dakota Rural Water System Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575,
Title XIX, § 1903, 106 Stat. 4674.
146

This project was authorized by the Mni Wiconi Project Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100516, 102 Stat. 2566. Section 10(a) of this act originally authorized the appropriation of
$87.5 million for the construction of the project. This amount was increased to $263,241,000
(prior to indexing) by section 813 of the Mni Wiconi Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-434, Title VIII, § 813, 108 Stat. 4545.
147

148

J. THORSON, supra note 100, at 77. Footnote omitted.

149
See, e.g., MISSOURI RIVER DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
MISSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE
STUDY: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(July, 1994).

49

The Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal

Engineers of its policies and operating criteria for the management of the
mainstem reservoirs,150 the formation of new interstate organizations to
address the emerging issues, and much controversy.
While the particulars differ and the details of these recent events are beyond
the scope of this paper, the parallels between current water management
issues in the Missouri and Colorado River Basins are many. Although the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission will not have the benefit
of a basin study for the Missouri River, these contemporary issues are
documented in other available literature. This author invites the
Commission's attention to these.151 In addition, the basin study of the North
Platte River which is being prepared for the Commission will, in may ways,
be illustrative of the same types of issues.
Suffice it to say for the purposes of this paper that, the historic deals having
not materialized as bargained for, the search by upper basin interests for
ways to garner a "fair share" of the benefits to be derived from federal water
projects goes on unabated—in both basins.

A Deal is Not a Deal
Introduction
At least when measured in terms of physical facilities --e.g., numbers of
dams, acre-feet of reservoir capacity for water conservation or flood control,
miles of canals, acres brought under irrigation, and miles of navigation
channel -- the two preceding sections demonstrate that upper basin water
development interests have in fact received the benefit of considerably less
federal water project development than they had bargained for, while the
lower basins have generally had their ends of the historical deals fulfilled. In
this section, the general factors which forestalled upper basin development
will be surveyed. From these will be extrapolated certain basic realities
about agreements forged in the political arena, as these realities will inform
the conclusions reached and recommendations made in the final section of
this paper.

Id. Due to the controversy which the study generated, the Corps' review of its Master
Water Control Manual is still underway.
150

151
While only current through about 1993-1994, the developments of the past 10-15
years are set out at some length in J. FERRELL, supra note 103, at 123-71 and in J.
THORSON, supra note 100, at 85-92, 99-113, 163-81. The Bureau of Reclamation and the
Corps of Engineers can undoubtedly provide the Commission with the current status of all
matters.
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What Went "Wrong?"
The legislation memorializing the political agreements which are the subject
of this paper only authorized the construction of certain projects.
Subsequent acts of Congress were required to appropriate monies with which
to actually construct any given project.152
However, in the context presented here, it is axiomatic that one Congress
cannot bind a future Congress. Rather, future Congresses are free to
appropriate or not appropriate funding for authorized projects and programs
as they see fit -- and for that matter to repeal, directly amend, or indirectly
supplant previously enacted authorizing legislation.153 Thus, authorizing
legislation was but the first step in the process of effectuating the political
agreements reached in the Colorado and Missouri River Basins.
As it has turned out, defending original authorizing acts from adverse
amendments or outright repeal, and gaining appropriations for authorized
projects, came no more easily for upper basin interests than the original
project authorizations themselves. While the particulars of what went
"wrong" vary between the two basins, and from project to project, certain
generalizations can be culled from the particulars:
1. More projects were authorized than could reasonably expect to receive
appropriations.
2. Obtaining the necessary appropriations required sustained political
support long after authorizing legislation had been signed into law.
3. The federal dollars available for the construction of federal water
development projects became increasingly limited over time.

152
This arrangement flows from the rules of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. In general, the rules of the two chambers prohibit appropriations for projects and
programs not previously authorized by statute. The effect of these rules is to subject an
appropriations bill to a parliamentary objection (a "point of order") which, if sustained by the
chair of the committee or chamber considering the bill, results in the offending appropriation
being deleted from the bill. While these rules, since they are only internal procedures, can
be explicitly waived or simply ignored by either House, the long-standing practice has been
to obtain authorization of a project before seeking appropriations for it. See I UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 1-17 - 1-18 (2d ed. 1991).

See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (reversed). See also 73 Am.
Jur. 2d, Statutes §§ 34, 378.
153
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4. New requirements for non-federal "up front" cost sharing were
imposed.
5. In the face of delays caused by the Congressional appropriations
process and other factors, changing economic conditions rendered nearly
all projects not under construction by the 1970s economically unjustified.
6. As detailed planning was undertaken after a project had been
authorized, engineering problems were sometimes discovered which
rendered some projects technically infeasible, or the solution to which
added so greatly to project costs (construction and/or operation and
maintenance) as to make a project economically unjustified.
7. Environmental concerns mounted and the influence and power of the
environmental movement expanded at the national level.
Each of these factors is briefly reviewed below.

1. More Projects Were Authorized Than Could be Funded
Federal statutes are replete with projects and programs encompassing every
aspect of government which have been authorized by Congress, but never
funded or only partially funded. This stems from the fact that the
Congressional authorization process and the appropriations process are
separate processes. With no limit on the dollar amounts which can be
authorized for future appropriations, many more projects and programs have
been, and continue to be, authorized than can ever be funded.
President Roosevelt's statement upon signing the legislation which
authorized the Missouri Basin's Pick-Sloan Plan presaged events to come in
this regard:
Roosevelt addressed the issue of authorization-appropriation. The tenuous
nature of dam-building legislation at the authorization stage was
evidenced in the President's remarks. He stated that authorized projects
listed in the bill would "augment the backlog of public works available for
prompt initiation, if necessary, in the postwar period." He intended to
submit estimates of appropriations ... only for those projects having
"important and direct value to the winning of the war."154

154
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Moreover, times have not changed, as evidenced by President Clinton's
statement upon the signing of the Water Resources Development Act of
1996,155 an omnibus authorizations act for Corps of Engineers' flood control,
navigation, and other public works projects:
I am concerned about the potential overall Federal cost of the bill. Under
existing budget constraints, many projects and initiatives authorized by
this bill cannot be funded within a reasonable timeframe. Thus, such
authorizations may raise unrealistic expectations for non-Federal sponsors
who expect timely project initiation and completion. ...156
In short, there has been (and continues to be) a tendency for Congress,
particularly in the context of reaching political agreements which
accommodate competing interests, to authorize many more projects than
could ever be funded. This was an easy step for lower basin legislators to
take via-a-vis the authorization of upper basin projects, as they knew that
they could live to fight another day, or stand by in neutrality, during the
annual appropriations processes which would ensue. Furthermore, this was
even a politically expedient way for upper basin Congresspersons and
Senators to proceed, at least in some instances, for it gave the appearance
that they had brought something home to their constituents, even if they
themselves never expected that the necessary follow-on appropriations could
be obtained, or that they would even still be in office and called upon by their
constituents to obtain appropriations with which to construct a project.
In the context of the historical deals discussed in this paper, it was as if a six
lane freeway (the deals memorialized in Congressional authorizing
legislation) suddenly narrowed to a two lane highway (the appropriation
process). Traffic necessarily backed up and some vehicles (the upper basins'
projects) ran out of gas (due to the other six factors discussed below) while
waiting in line. These vehicles are now parked on the shoulder of the road
getting ever more rusty, if not in fact completely abandoned.

2. Sustained Support for Appropriations
155

Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, 110 Stat. 3658.

Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 640, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2062 (October 21, 1996).
156
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Obtaining appropriations to initiate and complete construction of a newly
authorized federal water project required long periods of time. There were
several reasons this.
First, as noted above, many more projects were authorized than could ever be
funded. This meant that many projects would be "backed up in line" and
would inevitably be delayed in obtaining appropriations, if they were ever
successful, as projects competed for scare dollars.
Second, projects were invariably authorized based only on feasibility level
planning, or less (as discussed in item 6 below). Consequently, construction
could not be initiated unless and until final plans for a project were prepared,
complete with engineering designs and specifications. Thus, the first task
facing project proponents was to obtain appropriations just to complete the
necessary planning. Delays of several years in this regard were common, and
then it would take several more years to complete the planning for a project
after appropriations began to flow to it.
Third, the tradition of the Appropriation Committees in both houses of
Congress has been to appropriate monies for each project on an annual basis,
rather than making a single appropriation which would cover the entire cost
of a project and remain available for expenditure without further
appropriation. Furthermore, in an effort to spread the available dollars
among as many projects as possible, monies for a given project were very
often appropriated at less than the optimal rate, thus dragging construction
out over more years than would have been required based solely on
construction scheduling requirements. The impacts of inflation compounded
problems, as construction costs escalated that much more when construction
was funded at less than optimal rates.
Finally, Senators and Congresspersons could make any deals they wanted,
and a President could even sign those deals into law, but the same or future
Presidents had no legal obligation to request, and often times did not
request, funding from Congress either to complete planning or initiate
construction of the federal water projects which had been embraced in a
political deal. Absent such a request, project proponents had to seek a
"write-in" appropriation above and beyond the President's budget request, a
process which nearly always resulted in delays in receiving the initial
appropriations with which to get a project underway.
In the face of a process that tended to be long and drawn out due to the
above-mentioned factors, obtaining appropriations to initiate and complete
construction of a federal water resources development project required the
utmost in political "staying" power and perseverance. Project proponents
54
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found themselves having to sustain political support for a project over many
years, even as the membership of their Congressional delegations changed
from time to time, new Administrations were elected, and governors came
and went.
The change of even a single elected official could make a big difference in
some cases. A classic example in this regard was the defeat of Congressman
Wayne Aspinall of Colorado -- who had chaired the Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives when the CAP legislation
was moving through Congress in the mid-1960s -- shortly after the
enactment of that legislation. There is no doubt that Colorado's Five Fingers
projects were authorized as part of the CAP bill in large part because of
Congressman Aspinall's position of power.157 Had he remained in office, he
could have held substantial sway over the appropriations process to
Colorado's benefit, even though appropriations were handled by a different
committee. However, with Aspinall's defeat, the mantle of power not only
shifted away from Colorado, but eventually to Congressman Morris Udall of
Arizona when he succeeded to the chairmanship of the committee. From this
vantage point, he guarded the interests of the CAP for many years.
Whether by skill, blind luck, or both, Lower basin interests were generally
more successful than their upper basin counterparts in generating the
sustained political support which was required to move a project through ten
to 15, or even 20 to 25, years of the annual appropriations process. For
example, the unity of the Arizona delegation in obtaining funding for the
CAP over a period of nearly 25 years has been unparalleled.

3. Federal Budget Constraints
The dollars available for construction of federal water resources projects
have always been finite. They became even more finite starting in the 1970s.
Several factors were at play.
First, the demands placed upon the total monies available for discretionary
spending programs greatly increased and the competition between programs
became very intense, the federal budget having last been balanced in the late
1960s. At the same time, western water project development declined in
political importance in the overall scheme of things. Consequently, federal
water development programs received an increasingly smaller portion of the
total dollars available for discretionary spending programs.

157

See H. INGRAM, supra note 3, at 66-83.
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Second, as more and more projects were completed, more and more money
had to be devoted to operation and maintenance of those projects. In the face
of overall budget pressures, construction dollars began to give way to the
need for operating and maintaining that which had already been constructed.
For example, while Reclamation's operation and maintenance budget has
never exceeded its construction budget, its appropriations for operation and
maintenance, which had never exceeded $100 million until about 1980, grew
from $127 million in 1986 to $284 million in 1995, while its construction
budget declined from an all time high of $774 million in 1985 to $433 million
in 1995.
Third, upper basin interests found themselves having to support the use of
Reclamation's limited construction budget for programs and activities that
diverted scarce dollars away from getting authorized projects underway, but
without which future development might be jeopardized. The principal
example in this regard occurred in the Colorado River Basin, where upper
basin interests had to contend with growing concerns in the 1960s and early
70s about the issue of salinity in the Colorado River. The problem had both
an international and a domestic dimension.
The international problem arose because of Mexico's objections to the quality
of water being delivered to it at the international boundary. Salinity
concentrations had increased sharply in 1961 due to the introduction of
highly saline irrigation drain water from the drainage system constructed by
Reclamation for Arizona's Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District. The drainage
water was returned to the river below the last point of diversion in the
United States, but above Mexico's point of diversion at Morelos Dam. The
domestic problem arose because of concerns on the part of the Lower Division
States that natural and man-made sources of salt loading to the river,
coupled with steadily increasing depletions by all states, would cause salinity
concentrations in the lower mainstem of the Colorado River to rise to
unacceptable levels.
To make a long story short,158 the solution to the international problem came
in the form of a 1973 agreement between Mexico and the United States as to
the quality of the water to be delivered to Mexico,159 and yet another political
deal between the basin states calling for the federally financed construction

A concise history of why the salinity issue developed and how it was dealt with, both
internationally and domestically, may be found in Friedkin, The International Problem with
Mexico Over the Salinity of the Lower Colorado River, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN
WEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RAPHAEL J. MOSES 31 (D. Getches ed. 1988).
158

Agreement on Colorado River Salinity Confirming Minute No. 242 of the
International Boundary and Water Commission, 24 U.S.T. 1968 (Aug. 30, 1973).
159
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of a desalting plant to treat the drainage return flows from the WelltonMohawk District so that these flows could be returned to the river and
delivered to Mexico, rather than being wasted to the ocean to the detriment
of the water supply available to the basin states. On the domestic front, the
states and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency agreed to certain
numeric criteria for salinity in the lower mainstem of the Colorado River160
and a program for the federally financed construction of salinity control
projects which would reduce salt loading to the Colorado River System.
Authorization of what came to be known as the Yuma Desalting Plant and
the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program was obtained from
Congress in 1974.161
While construction of the Yuma Desalting Plant ran into the hundreds of
millions of dollars, the Upper Division States found themselves supporting its
construction out of Reclamation's limited budget for fear that not treating the
irrigation drainage from the Wellton-Mohawk District (which in the 1970s
was running roughly 150,000 acre-feet per year) would adversely affect the
water supplies available to those states for future development. Similarly,
the Upper Division States dutifully, if not enthusiastically, supported
appropriations for salinity control projects (which have totaled over
$300 million since the inception of the program), since failure to meet the
established numeric criteria for salinity concentrations in the lower
mainstem of the river would jeopardize their ability (and that of the Lower
Division States as well) to fully utilize their compact entitlements. However,
every dollar devoted to the desalting plant and to salinity control projects
was a dollar less for the construction of the CRSP participating projects for
which the Upper Division States had fought so hard.
Another example of how upper basin interests found themselves having to
support the use of Reclamation's limited budget for other than the
construction of authorized projects would be the demand for fish and wildlife

The numeric criteria, and the history of their development, are set forth in
COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, PROPOSED WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SALINITY INCLUDING NUMERIC CRITERIA AND PLAN
OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR SALINITY CONTROL: COLORADO RIVER BASIN 1-10,
53-62 (June, 1975).
160

161
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974)
(codified as amended in part at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1571-1599 (1996 & Supp. 1997)). Title I of the
act authorized, among other things, the desalting plant, while Title II authorized the
construction of certain salinity control projects for reducing salt loading to the river as the
initial features of the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program. For a summary of
legislative changes to the Salinity Control Program since 1974, see BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION BASINWIDE PROGRAM 2-6 (Feb., 1996).
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mitigation. As environmental awareness grew in the 1970s and 80s, so did
the pressure on Reclamation to accelerate the completion of authorized fish
and wildlife mitigation features and recreational facilities at already
completed projects or projects under construction. The dollars for such
projects, features, and facilities came out of the finite construction budget
available to Reclamation and necessarily made it more difficult to find dollars
for "new starts" on water supply projects. On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that recreational facilities at Reclamation's projects have
yielded major benefits to the upper basin states both in the Colorado and
Missouri River Basins.162

4. Non-Federal, Up-Front Cost Sharing
Prior to the Administration of President Carter, it was uniformly accepted
that Congress financed 100 percent of the construction costs of a federal
water development project (except for the requirement, discussed earlier in
this paper, that non-federal interests obtain all lands, easements, and rightsof-way required for flood control projects). However, reforms proposed early
in President Carter's tenure called for non-federal entities to provide ten
percent of the construction cost of a project at the time of construction (i.e.,
"up front"). This proposal eventually evolved into the cost sharing
requirements imposed by Congress on Corps programs in 1986163 and on
individual Reclamation projects by Congress and the Reagan and Bush
Administrations on a case-by-case basis.164
Non-federal, up-front cost sharing was not contemplated at the time the
upper and lower basin interests reached their past agreements. The
imposition of this requirement in recent years has given various upper basin

In 1992, public recreation on the six mainstem reservoirs on the Missouri River came
to 49.5 million visitor hours. Supra note 148. In 1995, there were more than 9 million
recreation visits to reclamation projects in the Upper Colorado River Basin, over half of
which occurred at Lake Powell (formed by Glen Canyon Dam) and Flaming Gorge Dam and
Reservoir in Utah and Wyoming. UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, supra note
33, at 51.
162

163
Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, Title I, 100 Stat.
4082. See also H. INGRAM, supra note 3, at 15-16.

Reclamation projects which have been subjected to new cost sharing requirements
include, for example, the Central Arizona Project, the Animas-La Plata Project, the
Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project, and the North Dakota municipal, rural, and
industrial water system authorized by the Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of
1986. See, e.g., Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 204, 106 Stat.
4614 (1992); Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-294, § 5, 100
Stat. 422.
164
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states pause.165 They, like the federal government, had only so much money
to devote to water project development -- and it was a lot less than the total
cost of all of the projects they had hoped for.

5. Project Economics
Under procedures that have generally been in place since the late 1930s,
federal agencies were not to seek or support the authorization of water
projects unless they had been found to be "economically justified." This
meant that a project had to have a benefit-cost ratio of 1:1 or greater.166 If
the benefit-cost ratio was less than 1:1, a project was deemed to be
"economically unjustified."
While projects may have been found to be economically justified at the time
they were authorized, re-evaluations over time led to different conclusions.
Thus, most, if not all, participating projects in the CRSP, except for the
Animas-La Plata Project,167 and nearly every irrigation project in the PickSloan Plan (see Appendix A) which are not now completed or under
construction were eventually determined to be economically unjustified.
There were at least three interrelated reasons for this.
First, the mere passage of time was working against upper basin interests.
During the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, construction costs escalated at a more rapid
Arizona, a lower basin state, also confronted this problem in the case of the CAP. To
the author's knowledge, this is the only significant example of a lower basin state in either
the Missouri or Colorado River Basins having to deal with this change in the "rules of the
game" as applied to the historical deals discussed in this paper.
165

A benefit-cost ratio compares the benefits of a project, to whomsoever they may
accrue, to the costs of the project, to whomsoever they may accrue, with the future streams of
anticipated benefits and costs both being discounted back to present values. Thus, if the
ratio of discounted benefits to discounted costs is less than 1:1, it indicates that the benefits
which it is projected will be received from a project are less than the costs which it is
projected will be incurred to construct, operate, and maintain the project. To the extent that
all benefits and costs of a project can be expressed in monetary terms, it obviously makes no
sense to pursue a project which will cost more than the benefits which it returns.
166

See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FRUITLAND-MESA PROJECT,
COLORADO: DEFINITE PLAN REPORT 69-70 (1977); U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, CONCLUDING REPORT ON THE WEST DIVIDE PROJECT,
COLORADO 86 (1981); and U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SAVERY-POT HOOK
PROJECT, COLORADO AND WYOMING: DEFINITE PLAN REPORT 74 (1977). The
Animas-La Plata Project has a benefit-cost ratio of 1.41 to 1 if the authorized discount rate
(i.e., the discount rate in effect in 1968) is used. If the current discount rate and
contemporary procedures for doing economic analyses are applied, the benefit-cost ratio
drops to .36 to 1. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT,
COLORADO - NEW MEXICO: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSES UPDATE (June,
1995) [hereinafter ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT].
167
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pace than did the benefits associated with irrigated agriculture in the upper
basin states in question. Thus, as projects languished in line waiting to
receive a "new start" appropriation with which to initiate construction, or
were delayed while they underwent re-evaluation on environmental grounds
in the 1970s and 80s (see item 7 below), the economic times passed them by.
Second, the procedures by which economic evaluations were performed were
revised in the 1960s and 1970s:
... Rules for evaluating federal water projects became increasingly
stringent under the Water Resources Planning Act [Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79
Stat. 244 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 et seq.)] and as
a result of criticisms of environmentalists and economists. Principles and
standards of evaluation evolved to include not just national economic
efficiency [i.e., the benefit-cost criterion] but also other "accounts,"
including environmental quality, social well-being, and regional economic
development. In the Carter years evaluation criteria were given the force of
regulations and environmental quality was elevated to equal importance
with national economic efficiency.168
Third, an economic evaluation is very sensitive to the discount rate which is
used, this being the percentage rate which is applied to estimated future
streams of costs and benefits to discount them back to the present. All other
things being equal, the larger the discount rate the smaller the benefit-cost
ratio for a water resources project becomes.169 Over time, the discount rate to
be used in economic analyses, which rate is established by the Office of
Budget and Management, has steadily increased -- and the benefit-cost
ratios for previously authorized projects have gone down accordingly.
While project authorizing legislation typically calls for the "official" economic
analysis of a project to be performed and reported to Congress using the
discount rate in effect at the time a project was authorized, all
Administrations, regardless of which political party occupied the White
House, have in fact applied the then current discount rate when deciding
whether to seek and support appropriations for a project. Thus, whatever
"official" benefit-cost ratio may have been reported to Congress, the
President has nearly always, if not always, refused to request funding to
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H. INGRAM, supra note 3, at 14.
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This is because project benefits, which extend far out into the future, are more
heavily discounted when expressed in present value terms than are project costs, the bulk of
which are incurred over just a few years (during the construction of a project) early in the
period of time over which discounting is computed.
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start construction of a project if its benefit-cost ratio was not equal to or
greater than 1:1 as computed using the then current discount rate.
When increasingly higher discount rates were coupled with project costs
which escalated faster than benefits, and with the application of the new
evaluation procedures developed in the 1960s and 70s, the resulting
reductions in benefit-cost ratios were dramatic.170 As noted above, nearly all
of the upper basin projects which have not been built were determined, under
the evolving federal "rules of the game," to be economically unjustified. This
determination, when coupled with budget constraints and environmental
issues, spelled the death knell of many a project, even though it was not
binding on Congress.

6. Incomplete Project Planning
As noted above, projects were invariably authorized based only on plans
completed at a feasibility level of detail, or less. Consequently, more detailed
planning always had to be undertaken for a project after it had been
authorized. As planning progressed, it was not unusual to encounter
engineering problems that had not been anticipated (e.g., foundation
problems for a dam, instability on a slope where a canal was to be
constructed, drainage problems for lands to be brought under irrigation, etc.).
In extreme cases, these problems might be so severe as to render a project
technically infeasible. Even if an engineering solution could be had, it might
add so greatly to project costs as to make a project economically unjustified.
While previously unidentified technical problems were to be expected to some
extent even when complete feasibility level planning had been accomplished,
the pressures of the political process also played a role when hurried deals
did not allow time for proper planning to be accomplished. For example,
neither the Corps nor Reclamation had done extensive planning on all of the
projects which were hurriedly combined in 1944 to create the Pick-Sloan
Plan.
This manifested itself when significant irrigation drainage problems were
subsequently encountered on a large number of the acres which were to be
brought under cultivation. While it is probably the most extreme example,
the situation at the Oahe Unit, Pick-Sloan Plan, is instructive. The drainage
problem in the nearly 500,000 acre Oahe Unit proved to be so difficult that

The updated economic analyses for the Animas-La Plata Project offer a very good
example in this regard. See, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT, supra note 167.
170
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Reclamation convened a consulting board of outside experts to advise it.171
Of the three general types of soil conditions found in the project area, the
consultants concluded that two simply were not susceptible of drainage by
practicable means. With respect to the third soil type, they found that it
could be drained if an appropriate system of subsurface tile, and the
associated collecting, drains were to be installed. However, the tile drains
would have had to be placed relatively close together (spacing of from 225 to
330 feet on every farm). Such spacing proved, in the end, to be prohibitively
expensive.
In the Colorado River Basin, an example of political pressures on the
planning process would seemingly be the Five Fingers projects in Colorado.
Although the planning reports supporting each of these projects as they
moved through the legislative authorization process in 1965-1968 were
denominated "feasibility studies," they were, in fact, little more than the
reconnaissance level plans that had been completed earlier. They were
rushed to completion as supposed feasibility studies by Reclamation to
satisfy the demands of Congressman Aspinall of Colorado, who was refusing
to hold hearings on the legislation to authorize the CAP until Colorado's
interests were addressed.172
Unforeseen engineering problems could, of course, arise for the projects
authorized either for the upper or lower basins. Being charitable, one might
simply note that the upper basins' projects, for whatever reasons, seem to
have encountered more difficulties in this regard than those of the lower
basins. From those who have a more jaundiced view of the political deals in
the Colorado and Missouri River Basins, one might hear the argument that
Reclamation, in the rush to appease its constituency, proposed projects which
never did have any hope of going forward.

7. Environmental Concerns
To state the obvious, concern about the environmental consequences of the
construction and operation of water resources development projects, and the
attendant consumption of water and reduction in stream flows, has become a
major public issue over the past 25-30 years. Instream flow requirements for
fisheries and recreation, loss of riverine habitat, water quality conditions,
endangered species concerns, modification of naturally occurring stream
171
S. Harding, J. Lakisch, C. Jacob, Report on the Drainability of Lands in the Oahe
Unit of the Missouri River Basin Project (Dec., 1954) (unpublished report available in the
author's personal files and presumably in the files of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation).
172
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temperature and turbidity conditions below reservoirs, and numerous other
environmental considerations that once would have been brushed aside came
to the forefront in the 1970s, symbolized by the signing into law on January
1, 1970, by President Nixon of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).173 Re-evaluation pursuant to NEPA of authorized but yet to be
initiated projects, and even of some already under construction, coupled with
the new evaluation standards for water projects noted above, combined to
highlight the significant and, in the eyes of many, unacceptable
environmental impacts which water projects can have.
The strength of the environmental movement also impacted the political
process that was required to sustain support for water projects as they
moved through the lengthy process required for final planning and initiation
of construction.
The growing power of the environmental movement at the national level
introduced untenable conflict into the process of obtaining political
approval of projects. Opposition by environmental groups cut into the
unified support prerequisite to a successful bid for project authorization.
Congressional sponsors of proposed projects were forced to spend more time
mediating conflict about the potentially environmentally damaging aspects
of plans. Even when sponsors won congressional battles, it was not
altogether certain that applause for bringing home the bacon would come
from constituents. Detractors who could not be placated continued to
maintain that water projects were environmental insults.
Further, legislators could no longer depend upon the mutual
noninterference rules that once governed congressional water politics.
Instead of respecting fellow legislators as the legitimate spokespersons of
their districts' welfare, environmentally oriented and fiscally concerned
members of Congress challenged whether water projects were anywhere in
the public interest. ...174
While environmental opposition to upper basin projects came principally
from national or regional organizations, it also came with increasing
frequency over time from citizens of the very states which would be
benefitted, and damaged, by a project. Furthermore, when there was
opposition to projects from the local farming community, as there was in
some instances, environmental interests were sometimes able to combine

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
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forces with these non-traditional allies to make the politics of supporting a
project even more complicated for elected officials.175
In short, it was a different political ballgame for upper basin operatives in
the 1970s, 80s, and 90s than it had been in the 40s, 50s, and 60s.

The Realities of Political Agreements
The history of the political agreements reached in the Colorado and Missouri
River Basins, and the foregoing survey of factors which brought about the
demise of the projects hoped for by upper basin water development interests,
reveal several realities about "deals" forged in the political arena:
1. A political agreement can be memorialized in a statute, but that
statute is not binding on future Congresses, which are free to amend,
repeal, or indirectly supplant the previous statute (i.e., the previous
agreement). Examples of this would be project de-authorizations (e.g.,
the 1964 de-authorization of the Pick-Sloan Plan's irrigation units not
then under construction and of other projects), the passage of NEPA and
numerous other environmental laws which have indirectly impacted
project authorizations, and new requirements for non-federal, up-front
cost sharing imposed on projects after their initial authorization.
2. Authorizing legislation must be followed by the requisite
appropriations. However, future Congresses are not bound to make any
appropriations and can simply ignore the agreement (i.e., the authorizing
legislation). Witness in this regard the numerous projects in the upper
basins which never received appropriations and were, therefore, never
constructed, even in the face of statutory language supposedly directing
that Colorado's Five Fingers CRSP participating projects were to be
constructed, "as nearly as practicable," concurrently with the construction
of the CAP.
3. As a consequence of the two preceding realities, political agreements
are, at best, only as good as the handshakes of the legislators who make
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Examples in this regard would be the Narrows Project on the South Platte River in
Colorado and the Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota. In both instances, the initial
opposition to these projects was locally based. In the case of the Narrows Project, local
farmers whose lands would have been inundated for a reservoir opposed the project. In
North Dakota, opposition to the McClusky Canal, the main conveyance facility for the
Garrison Diversion Unit, came from many of the farmers (and the local chapters of the
national farm organizations to which they belonged) whose lands would be taken for and
divided by the canal. National environmental organizations arrived on the scene later and
combined forces with these local opponents to eventually kill both projects.
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them and they last, therefore, only as long as those actors remain on the
scene and in power. The political "staying power" required to move a
project through the annual appropriations process over many years is the
quintessential example of this reality.
4. The circumstances which prevailed at the time a political agreement is
reached will almost inevitably change over time for reasons that are
beyond the control of all involved in the agreement. There are many
examples in this regard: changing societal values and concerns, failing
project economics, changing federal budgetary circumstances, new
environmental concerns and laws addressing those concerns, and vastly
increased public interest in outdoor recreation opportunities at Corps and
Reclamation reservoirs.
5. In turn, changed circumstances will almost always prompt
reevaluation and reconsideration of previous public policy decisions by
those who were not party to, or did not agree with, the original decision.
In the Congressional arena, one can quite often keep an issue alive and
get a second bite at the apple if they were not satisfied with the first bite.
Put another way, a political agreement, even though "enacted into law," is
something vastly different than a legally binding and enforceable contract. It
can hardly be said that an agreement existed which the federal government
was legally beholden to observe. From this perspective, the bargains made in
the past cannot be said to have been broken by Congress -- it had no
obligation to "keep the deals" in the first place. Rather, the deals which
upper basin water interests made were necessarily subject to the vagaries of
the political process.
Furthermore, upper basin states were not misled when they entered into the
"deals" described in this paper. They knew and understood the realities of
political agreements.176 Upper basin states bargained valiantly with
whatever power of facts, persuasion, committee chairmanships in Congress,
and votes were at their disposal at the time. They held out as long as they
could for as much as they could. It was their only hope, and they knew it.
In summary, political deals, even though "enacted into law" by Congress, are
always subject to one constant -- they can be changed. They are not legally
binding and they can never be guaranteed. This always has been, and always
will be, the upper basins' political conundrum -- a deal is really not a deal.
176
This statement is certainly true of federal, state, and local elected officials, state
water agency officials, and the astute leadership of local water districts, as they were day-today participants in the political process. It is doubtful, however, that the average aspiring
irrigator really grasped the hollowness of the "promises" being made to him.
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Conclusions and Recommendations to the Commission
Introduction
The upper basins clearly did not receive, for the reasons explained above,
that for which they had bargained, while the lower basins generally did. This
section will explore whether the Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Commission should endeavor to address this situation in the course of its
deliberations.

A Clash of Perspectives
From the perspective of many upper basin water development interests, the
political agreements described in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper constituted
"deals" between the upper and lower basins that the federal government and
the lower basin states were at least duty bound, if not legally bound, to
honor. In the eyes of those who are advocates of further upper basin water
resources development, the fact that the projects "promised" to them by the
political agreements of the past did not materialize is often described, with
heartfelt frustration, as being "unfair" or "inequitable."
They argue that upper basin states have been "short changed" because many
of their authorized federal water projects did not go forward, while nearly all
of the projects in, or to the benefit of, the lower basins did get constructed -sometimes at the expense of the upper basins' lands and riverine resources
being inundated to build reservoirs for the lower basins' benefit. The lower
basins having gotten "theirs," upper basin interests believe that the
completion of the upper basins' bargained for federal water projects -- or,
federally financed contemporary substitutes therefore or receipt of a "fair
share" of the benefits which can now be derived from the projects which have
in fact been developed (e.g., recreational benefits on the Missouri River
mainstem reservoirs) -- is now "owed" to the upper basin states.177
In the context of the Colorado River Basin, one commentator captured the
typical perspective of traditional upper basin water development interests'
with the following observations:

Others, of course, both within and outside of the upper basins, do not share this view,
particularly with respect to the call for federal financing and construction of more authorized
projects or substitutes therefore.
177
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The development of the Colorado River Basin has been enormously uneven.
Upper Basin states have lagged behind the Lower Basin, and within the
Lower Basin ... Los Angeles and the Imperial Valley [and one could now
add the Central Arizona Project] have consumed vast quantities of water.
This growth was made possible in part through the consent of upstream
users who believed that they would eventually have a turn in line for
federally funded water development. The case of the state of Colorado in
the Upper Basin ... [has been] systematically laid out:
"Colorado's position consists of several elements: (1) that over a span of
more than 60 years this State has cooperated generously with other
states and with the Federal Government in fabricating a "Law of the
River"; (2) that through this carefully, although not flawlessly, crafted
system of compacts and Federal statutes Colorado is entitled to make
beneficial use of more than 3 million acre-feet of water from the river
system; (3) that Congress registered its unequivocal intent in every
major act concerning the Colorado River to develop completely -- that is
to treat the entire basin as an integrated hydro-climatic system ...; (4)
that as part of this overall plan, the Federal Government had explicitly
committed itself to construct and operate dams and reclamation projects
in Colorado (by the terms of various acts); (5) that realistically
Colorado's full compact share of the river system could only be made
available to the people of the State if and when the Federal Government
completed the promised projects at Federal expense; [i.e., the people of
Colorado were owed a federal subsidy, and] (6) consequently the
Federal Government and the other compact States have not only a
statutory commitment but a moral/historic obligation to support
Federal development of water projects."
... It is patently unfair for the claimants who have yet to develop to carry
their [sic] entire burden for previous decisions overestimating the amount
of water in the river and underestimating claims of Indians and Mexicans
and the possible adverse environmental consequences of overbuilding on
the river. The obligation for satisfying all legitimate claims that exist on
the river belong especially to the Lower Basin users whose interests have
been for so long so well served.178

Ingram, Scaff, and Silko, Replacing Confusion with Equity: Alternatives for Water
Policy in the Colorado River Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER -MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 177 (G. Weatherford and F. Brown ed.s 1983),
quoting from McBride, "Colorado Water Resources Development Politics" (paper presented at
the annual convention of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, March 24-26,
1983). Footnote omitted.
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In the context of the Missouri River Basin, another commentator offers this
view:
The Pick-Sloan Plan has not worn well with the passage of time. In the
years following its authorization, not all of the terms of the historic
agreement have been carried out. To be sure, six great dams have been
constructed on the Missouri main stem, flooding has been avoided, and
navigation on the lower reaches of the river has greatly improved. Very
little, however, of the upper basin's irrigated agriculture potential has been
realized. Moreover, the hydropower that was to benefit rural agricultural
communities now finds its way to such out-of-basin places as MinneapolisSt. Paul.
The basin's Indian tribes, especially those that had reservations on the
main stem, have benefited little if at all. ...
The virtues of the Pick-Sloan Plan have also been undermined by dramatic
trends since its implementation. The systemic problems of agriculture,
owing to international competition, U.S. monetary policy, and changeable
farm policies, have been powerful barriers to the development of
agriculture in the upper basin states. Furthermore, a nation plagued by
continuing federal fiscal imbalance has less tolerance for funding water
development projects -- especially those with potential adverse
environmental impacts. ...
... [T]he Pick-Sloan Plan, rather than achieving the anticipated cooperation and economic development among basin residents, has results in
an inequitable distribution of benefits favoring the lower basin. This
continuing inequity undermines efforts at cooperation and produces new
tensions. ... The failed Pick-Sloan Plan has poisoned relationships among
basin states and tribes, creating a burden that is now shared by the entire
basin.179
To be sure, there are those who, with equal conviction, will argue that upper
basin interests have themselves to thank to some extent for their problems
(e.g., local opposition to their own projects and hastily planned projects that
proved to be infeasible) or that the upper basins benefitted handsomely and
are therefore due nothing more in the name of being made "whole" relative to
some past political deal. From the debate about the loss of lands in South
Dakota due to the construction of the mainstem reservoirs, the following
1981 commentary from an Iowa newspaper is illustrative:
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It strikes us that South Dakota has received as many flood control benefits
as its downstream neighbors, so that "sacrifice" talk is specious. In
addition, South Dakota and its citizens received the financial benefits of
millions of dollars of federal monies spent in the state during the score of
years it took to build the entire ... impoundment system ... [on the
mainstem]. ... [F]urther ..., these impoundments have given South Dakota
a recreational potential that is the wonder and envy of the nation. What
kind of "sacrifice" is this? No, South Dakota has been paid off for the
Missouri impoundments 180
Or, rather than engaging in a public debate as to where the equities lie, a
more measured and guarded lower basin reaction (Colorado or Missouri
River Basins) might simply be a knowing shrug and unspoken truth: "Time
passed the upper basins by -- those are the breaks."
Not unexpectedly, perspectives clash as to whether the upper basins have
been, and are now being, fairly treated.

What Should the Commission Do?
Were the Commission to address itself to the circumstance that lower basin
interests have generally received the projects promised them from federal
water development programs, while the upper basins have not, it would,
among other things, have to decide what benefits have or have not been
received by whom and have to assess where the equities in the historical
treatment of the basins lay. For the reasons explained below, this author is
of the opinion that this would not be a fruitful area of inquiry for the
Commission.
This is not to say that equitable treatment of the upper and lower portions of
a basin as regards the distribution of benefits (and costs) from federal water
resources projects and programs is not important. Quite to the contrary.
Public policy decisions should always be, in this author's opinion, informed by
considerations of distributive justice, social equity, and fairness.181
Rather, this conclusion derives solely from the judgment that "redressing"
the "unfair" treatment which upper basin water development interests

180
Sioux City Journal, Oct. 3, 1981, quoted in J. THORSON, supra note 100, at 237 (in
footnote 58).

For an enlightening, albeit somewhat philosophical, dissertation in this regard, as
applied specifically to the issue of equities in the Colorado River Basin, see Ingram, Scaff,
and Silko, supra note 178, at 177-199.
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believe has befallen them is a task which is uniquely the province of elected
and appointed officials working in the political process, whatever the
Commission might think of the arguments on either side of the equity issue.
Generating a "Pick-Sloan Plan II" or "Son of CRSP" is not a task which the
Commission can effectively undertake. There are several reasons for this
conclusion.
First, political deals such as were reached in the Colorado and Missouri River
Basins are primarily creatures of political compromise and the legislative
process, not of national policy considerations, although such considerations
certainly provided the context in which the agreements were set (e.g., the
federal social and economic policy of settling the then agrarian West in part
undergirded the deals in the Colorado River Basin, while having employment
available for soldiers returning from World War II and repopulating the
Great Plains were policies which framed the development of a plan for the
"comprehensive development" of the Missouri River Basin). Given the
realities of political agreements as summarized in the preceding section of
this paper, and given the nature of the Commission as a study and
recommending body, refashioning such agreements would not lend itself to
the kind of policy deliberations for which the Commission is best equipped.
Second, and as a corollary to the first point, considerations of equity in the
distribution of federal dollars and the benefits to be derived from a given
federal program can only be addressed in the Congressional process of
making individual project authorization and appropriation decisions. Such
decisions, especially as they pertain to funding levels, are not matters to
which the Commission can usefully address itself.
Third, refashioning past agreements necessarily requires that new political
agreements be enacted by Congress in the form of amendatory or new
authorizing legislation. Needless to say, any new agreements for water
project development, or substitutes therefore, in the upper basins would be
subject to the vicissitudes of the political process to the same extent as the
original agreements. Contemporary proof of this may be found in three
salient examples.
The Animas-La Plata Project is a cornerstone of the Colorado Ute Indian
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988. The water marketing provision of the
act182 was strongly opposed by the three Lower Division States, and even to
some extent by Utah and Wyoming. Compromises were eventually reached
and the legislation moved through Congress after two years of arduous

Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, §
5(b), 102 Stat. 2974.
182
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negotiations. The very next year, an endangered native fish species was
found in the San Juan River. Then, lawsuits were brought by environmental
interests alleging that Reclamation had not completed the necessary
environmental compliance for the project. Thirty years after it was
authorized, and nine years after it was reaffirmed in a new deal with the
Lower Basin, construction of the project has yet to be initiated.
The reformulation of the Garrison Diversion Unit is equally instructive. The
multi-party negotiations which led to the passage of the Garrison Diversion
Unit Reformulation Act183 were as complex and intense as any associated
with the historical agreements of the 40s, 50s, and 60s. This time, national
environmental interests were at the table. Yet, only four years later, the
Bush Administration, an actor not party to the mid-1980s negotiations,
declined to proceed with the non-Indian irrigation portions of the
reformulated project.184 The deal, in the form of the act, is still on the books,
but appropriations with which to proceed have not been forthcoming. It has
an all too familiar ring to the upper basin.
As a final example, the recent authorizations and appropriations which
Congress has made for the rural domestic water supply systems in the
Dakotas are instructive. These are not decisions which flowed from broad
policy deliberations such as the Commission can engage in, but rather from
the give and take of the political process.
Put another way, the Commission is not in a position to broker new deals.
These are matters that must necessarily be left by the Commission to the
states and to the Executive Branch and Congress.
Fourth, it can no longer be automatically said that each and every upper
basin state, acting through its state officials, wholeheartedly expects, or
desires, the near-term development of such water resources as may yet be
available to it for beneficial consumptive uses. To the contrary, the nearly
uniform position of upper basin states in support of water project
development in the past has given way to a broad range of official state
policies and positions in recent years. Different states have adopted different
strategies for dealing with the protection and development of their remaining
entitlements to the waters of interstate streams, reservations of instream
flows, non-federal water project financing, operation of reservoirs to achieve
contemporary recreational benefits, and even the interstate marketing of
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT TASK
GROUP REPORT (October, 1990).
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water. It would not be prudent for the Commission to presume that there is
uniform support within the upper basin states to complete the development
contemplated in past political agreements. These are matters best left to the
states.
Finally, to the extent that broad policy considerations undergird individual
project authorizations, "righting" the "wrongs" of the past should not be
premised upon extending into the next century social and economic policies
that, whatever their validity earlier in this century may have been, no longer
fit the circumstances at hand. The West has now been settled, incremental
increases in irrigated agriculture would contribute very little to sustaining its
overall economy, and the boys who returned from World War II have long
since found employment. Merely fulfilling past political agreements, simply
because they were made, is not a sufficient reason, in and of itself, for the
Commission to engage in a search for additional water development projects
for the benefit of the upper basins.
While it is not recommended that the Commission engage in an attempt to
fashion new basin plans for the distribution of federal water project benefits
as between upper and lower basins, the author does believe that the
Commission's deliberations should be informed by an awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the perception, if not the reality, of the inequities which the
upper basins have (or believe they have) experienced. Attitudes and
approaches to the resolution of many current water resources management
issues are inevitably colored by perceptions of past treatment.
Furthermore, the author would invite the Commission to consider making
certain observations to Congress and the federal water resources agencies
about any efforts to address whatever inequities may have arisen between
upper and lower basins because past political agreements were not fulfilled:
1. The equitable "re-distribution" of the benefits which can now be
derived from existing projects is one way to redress failed past promises.
Indeed, such management issues are now far more likely to be the focus
of discussions between the upper and lower basins than are debates
about who gets which new federal water project. A salient example in
this regard is the issue of how to operate the mainstem reservoirs on the
Missouri River now that a valuable recreational economy has
unexpectedly developed in the upper basin, while navigation has been
declining on the lower mainstem.185
185
It is also to be acknowledged that the debate over the "best" operation of the
mainstem reservoirs, besides having an upstream-downstream component to it, also has a
consumptive versus non-consumptive use component to it, as is typical of water management
issues throughout the West in this day and age.
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2. In the face of contemporary circumstances, past deals simply will not
be fulfilled in the manner originally envisioned. Thus, if inequities have
resulted which merit being redressed, old deals will have to be re-opened
and re-negotiated. The parameters within which the federal government
is prepared to come to the table, if at all, need to be established.
3. Finally, it is readily apparent that political agreements among the
basins, and among the states and the federal government, must always
deal with one constant -- and that is ever changing circumstances. Thus,
preserving and maintaining flexibility, while still achieving a reasonable
degree of security and certainty for all concerned, will be the hallmarks of
successful agreements in the future.

A Postscript
The question to which this paper has been addressed was narrowly drawn -i.e., whether the "inequities" experienced by the upper basins because federal
water project development did not proceed in accordance with historical
political agreements is a situation to which the Commission should address
itself. Accordingly, this paper has necessarily examined only one element in
the argument made by upper basin interests that they have been and are
being treated "inequitably" -- namely, that more federally financed water
projects, or more benefits from existing federal projects, should be directed
their way in order to fulfill past promises.
There is, however, a second element to the upper basins' argument that they
are being treated "inequitably." Besides being concerned that federal water
projects have been developed for the lower basins largely as promised, but
not for the upper basins, upper basin states are also concerned that today's
federal environmental laws, regulations, policies, programs, and agency
decisions are adversely impacting their ability to manage -- as they see fit
and in accordance with their state laws and the applicable interstate
compacts and decrees -- water supplies which have already been developed
(privately or federally) in their states. They also fear that even if they and
their water users choose to provide non-federal sources of financing for the
development of such addition water development projects as they believe to
be in the state's interest, they still will not be able to construct such projects.
Upper basin water development interests see these circumstances as being
"unfair" and "inequitable" when viewed against the backdrop of the lower
basins having been able to fully consume or otherwise develop the waters
allocated to them, in large part due to federally financed construction of
water projects.
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The increasingly fractious interface between the vast array of federal
environmental authorities and policies on the one hand, and the exercise of
vested water rights under state law and the utilization of waters allocated by
compact and decree on the other hand, is a pressing problem. It involves
broad issues of national policy that are deserving of and amenable to
deliberation by the Commission, including consideration of the equities that
flow, intended or unintended, from the implementation of these
environmental authorities and policies -- not only as between upper and
lower basins, but also as between the beneficiaries of traditional
consumptive uses of water and of non-consumptive recreational and
environmental uses.
The issues involved are recounted in the six basin studies for which the
Commission has contracted and therefore will not be enumerated here. For
the purposes of this paper, it will merely be observed that these issues are, in
this author's opinion, being played out in three related, but importantly
different (from a legal perspective), contexts:
(1) changing the uses and management of the water supplies available
from existing federal water resources projects (the water supplies from
which are subject to a project's authorized purposes and are subject to
contracts between the United States and the water users), which changes
stem both from regulatory requirements and discretionary policy choices
by federal agencies,
(2) federal regulatory impacts and constraints on the use and
management of existing non-federal projects, and
(3) federal regulatory impacts and constraints on the further
development, with non-federal financing, of a state's water resources.
The six basin studies, at least in their draft form, generally did not given
attention to the matter of equities as between upper and lower basins. Yet,
considerations of the equitable treatment of the basins pervades, implicitly if
not explicitly, many of the contemporary water management issues and
debates to which the Commission's attention is being invited. This aspect of
the upper basins' argument, unlike the one upon which this paper has
focused, does merit attention.
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Appendix A

Proposed Projects

State

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Full 1

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Partial 2

Capacity
(kW)

Power Investment

Reservoir
Storage
Investment

Benefit/
Cost
Ratio

FUTURE UNITS
North Republican Unit

CO/NE

2,400

2,700

0

$0

$0

0.18

Wilson Unit

KS

25,000

0

0

$0

$0

0.10

Alzada Unit

MT

9,000

0

0

$0

$0

0.10

Battlefield Unit

MT

1,200

0

94

$64,741

$2,603,800

0.05

Benteen Flat Unit

MT

1,600

0

0

$0

$3,473,300

0.07

Bonanza Unit

MT

800

0

58

$39,946

$72,056

0.33

Brush Unit

MT

1,000

0

70

$48,211

$90,070

0.46

Cameron Bench Unit

MT

4,000

3,100

0

$0

$0

0.07

Chestnut Valley Unit

MT

4,600

0

0

$0

$0

0.05

Clarkston Unit

MT

1,000

0

134

$92,290

$0

0.09

Cracker Box Unit

MT

1,600

0

106

$73,005

$0

0.07

Crow Unit

MT

1,200

0

69

$47,522

$2,603,800

0.05

Diamond Ranch Unit

MT

900

0

0

$0

$81,063

0.39

Dunmore Unit

MT

11,400

0

0

$0

$24,740,800

0.10

Elm Coulee Unit

MT

2,000

0

445

$306,485

$0

0.18

Farmer Creek Unit

MT

1,600

0

187

$128,793

$144,112

0.39

Gallatin Unit

MT

0

59,100

3,064

$2,110,269

$0

0.79

Glasgow Bench Unit

MT

59,400

0

15,300

$10,537,569

$5,350,158

0.37

Haley Unit

MT

2,400

0

703

$484,177

$0

0.19

Hardin Unit

MT

42,600

1,000

13,300

$9,160,109

$0

0.06

Hardscrabble Unit

MT

2,200

0

273

$188,023

$198,154

0.41

Hobson Unit

MT

0

6,000

0

$0

$0

0.02

Huntley Extension Unit

MT

1,800

0

52

$35,814

$0

0.03

Jefferson Unit

MT

47,400

15,200

0

$0

$0

0.06

Lewistown Unit

MT

4,000

0

0

$0

$0

0.07

Madison Unit

MT

12,600

13,600

0

$0

$0

0.08

Marsh Unit

MT

2,800

0

716

$493,131

$0

0.03

Medicine Lake North

MT

14,700

0

7,440

$5,124,151

$1,324,029

0.13

Medicine Lake South

MT

24,700

0

10,130

$6,976,835

$2,224,729

0.15

Missouri Diversion Unit

MT

92,800

0

28,720

$19,780,326

$8,358,496

0.17

N-Bar-N Unit

MT

7,200

0

739

$508,971

$648,504

0.22

Newlan Unit

MT

3,900

0

0

$0

$0

0.03

Nickwall Unit

MT

2,800

0

245

$168,739

$252,196

0.29

Nohle Unit

MT

1,700

0

242

$166,673

$153,119

0.34

Rock Creek Unit

MT

1,000

200

0

$0

$0

0.06

Ross Fork Unit

MT

3,000

0

0

$0

$0

0.08

Saco Divide Unit

MT

9,400

0

1,800

$1,239,714

$0

0.10

Seven Mile-Sitting Bull Unit

MT

6,500

0

941

$648,095

$0

0.08

Seven Sisters Unit

MT

3,200

0

1,462

$1,006,923

$0

0.13
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Proposed Projects

State

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Full 1

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Partial 2

Capacity
(kW)

Power Investment

Reservoir
Storage
Investment

Benefit/
Cost
Ratio

FUTURE UNITS
Shoestring Unit

MT

1,200

0

109

$75,072

$108,084

0.27

Shotgun (privately developed)

MT

0

0

0

$0

$0

NA

Sidney Unit

MT

1,000

0

266

$183,202

$0

0.12

Stipek Unit

MT

2,900

0

1,211

$834,052

$0

0.12

Sun-Teton Division

MT

53,200

3,700

1,422

$979,374

$0

0.01

Whitehall Unit

MT

6,700

3,900

0

$0

$0

0.12

West Bench Unit

MT

0

6,700

0

$0

$0

0.07

Wyola Unit

MT

3,600

0

0

$0

$7,816,100

0.09

Yellow Bluff Unit

MT

1,300

0

118

$81,270

$117,091

0.35

Bismarck Unit

ND

8,500

0

514

$354,007

$765,595

0.11

Broncho Unit

ND

15,400

0

0

$0

$0

0.08

Burnt Creek Unit

ND

1,300

0

64

$44,079

$117,091

0.12

Hancock Flats Unit

ND

5,400

0

1,202

$827,853

$486,378

0.12

Horsehead Flats Unit

ND

6,500

0

1,494

$1,028,963

$585,455

0.07

Manley Unit

ND

1,200

0

47

$32,370

$108,084

0.21

Nesson Unit

ND

7,400

0

591

$407,039

$666,518

0.38

Oliver-Sanger Unit

ND

8,300

0

2,109

$1,452,532

$747,581

0.14

Painted Woods Unit

ND

2,800

0

601

$413,927

$252,196

0.11

Square Butte Unit

ND

1,900

0

94

$64,741

$171,133

0.09

Williston Unit

ND

8,500

0

1,689

$1,163,265

$765,595

0.33

Winona Unit

ND

4,500

0

686

$472,469

$405,315

0.08

Wogansport Unit

ND

1,600

0

172

$118,462

$144,112

0.09

Albion Division

NE

16,900

1,900

364

$250,698

$0

0.05

Cedar Rapids Division

NE

29,800

0

97

$66,807

$0

0.05

Little Blue Unit

NE

20,000

0

0

$0

$0

0.03

Mirage Flats Extension

NE

5,900

0

0

$0

$0

0.04

Belle Fourche Units

SD

5,000

0

290

$199,732

$0

0.06

Crazy Horse Unit

SD

500

0

32

$22,039

$45,035

0.11

Culdesac Unit

SD

5,400

0

1,848

$1,272,773

$486,378

0.08

Fort Thompson Unit

SD

7,500

0

1,841

$1,267,952

$675,525

0.19

Grass Rope Unit

SD

4,300

0

1,366

$940,805

$387,301

0.09

Greenwood Unit

SD

4,900

0

472

$325,081

$441,343

0.18

Iron Nation Unit

SD

1,700

0

503

$346,431

$153,119

0.06

Joe Creek Unit

SD

4,400

0

1,649

$1,135,716

$396,308

0.08

LaRoche Unit

SD

1,800

0

551

$379,490

$162,126

0.03

Pine Ridge Unit

SD

12,700

0

1,695

$1,167,397

$0

0.02

Rousseau Unit

SD

2,200

0

566

$389,821

$198,154

0.06

Tower Unit

SD

2,000

0

100

$68,873

$180,140

0.29

Yankton Unit

SD

1,100

0

58

$39,946

$99,077

0.05
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Proposed Projects

State

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Full 1

Acres
to be
Irrigated:
Partial 2

Capacity
(kW)

Power Investment

Reservoir
Storage
Investment

Benefit/
Cost
Ratio

FUTURE UNITS
Edgemont Unit

SD/WY

4,700

0

0

$0

$0

0.02

Bighorn Unit

WY

1,700

0

426

$293,399

$374,054

0.15

Boysen Unit

WY

0

0

0

$0

$0

0.00

Buffalo

WY

3,000

7,100

0

$0

$0

0.09

Crazy Woman Unit

WY

5,700

6,400

280

$192,844

$0

0.10

French Creek Unit

WY

800

2,500

0

$0

$0

0.07

Greybull Flat Unit

WY

1,000

0

343

$236,234

$211,281

0.17

Hudson Bench Unit

WY

5,700

0

0

$0

$513,399

0.16

Kaycee Unit

WY

23,100

5,600

2,529

$1,741,798

$0

0.08

Lower Powder Units

WY

58,500

0

4,290

$2,954,652

$0

0.23

Piney Unit

WY

4,000

16,000

56

$38,569

$0

0.21

Sheridan Unit

WY

0

38,100

0

$0

$0

0.20

Shoshoni Unit

WY

16,600

0

2,210

$1,522,093

$3,578,846

0.31

Tongue Pumping Units

WY

26,100

0

1,800

$1,239,714

$0

0.12

Ucross Unit

WY

2,800

7,100

224

$154,276

$0

0.04

REAUTHORIZED
Pollock-Herried Unit

3

SD

15,000

0

6,060

$4,173,704

$1,351,050

1.7—1968

Garrison Diversion 4

ND

115,740

0

72,298

$50,753,288

$20,357,702

0.70—1992

Lake Andes-Wagner 5

SD

45,000

0

23,900

$16,460,647

$4,053,150

0.56 &
1.02—1986

Shoshone Extension 6

WY

36,600

37,300

522

$0

$200,660

2.08—1967

CO

0

225,800

0

$0

$0

1.62—1967

NE

140,000

0

16,800

$11,570,664

$0

1.4—1960

NE

77,000

0

4,515

$3,109,616

$0

1.53—1971

SD

495,000

0

157,236

$108,293,150

$44,584,650

1.7—1965

Narrows Unit

7

Nebraska-Mid State Div. 8
O'Neill Unit

9

10

Oahe Unit
Abbreviations
CO
KS
MT
ND
NE
SD
WY

Colorado
Kansas
Montana
North Dakota
Nebraska
South Dakota
Wyoming

Source: Personal communication, George St. George, Great Plains Region, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, February 28, 1997.
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1. Full acres are irrigated acres using Federal irrigation water only.
2. Partial acres are irrigated acres using Federal water as a supplement to other sources
of irrigation water.
3. The appropriation was deauthorized by P.L. 100-516, which also authorized the MniWiconi Rural Water Supply Project. No studies were done to determine project feasibility
but rather local interests suggested deauthorization of the irrigation development as a tradeoff for development of a rural domestic water supply and distribution system to serve the
needs of the Indian and non-Indian populations in the area. The power allocation for the
unit was made available for the municipal and industrial system and funding for irrigation
and development was deauthorized. The irrigation unit remains a future unit of Pick-Sloan
as provided in the legislation.
4. The acreage for the Garrison Diversion Unit was reduced from 1,000,007 acres to
130,940 acres by P.L. 99-294, and further reduced to 115,740 acres by P.L. 102-575. It was
recognized at the time of reformulation (1986) that the reduced scope of the project would
result in economic infeasibility because of the loss of economies-of-scale and other factors.
The reformulation took place as a compromise solution. Subsequent to reallocation of project
costs, it was determined that the project was also financially infeasible because the irrigation
annual operation and maintenance costs exceeded the irrigator's computed ability to pay. A
team appointed by the Secretary recommended that further irrigation development on the
project be halted. The State of North Dakota and the Garrison Conservancy District are
developing a proposal for the future of the project.
5. The unit was authorized by the Lake-Andes/Marty II Unit Act of 1992 (P.L 102-575).
The benefit/cost ratio for this unit was based on post-1979 methodologies. Reclamation
employed "customized procedures" in calculating the ratio that allowed the consideration of a
specialty crop (potatoes) as a benefit. The Planning Report/Draft EIS (1985) exhibited a
benefit cost ratio under strict P&G standards of .56. Under the customized procedures which
included specialty crops (potatoes), livestock intensification, and alternative price
normalization, the B/C was 1.02. This was the basis under which Congress authorized the
project. Development of the full 45,000 acres is dependent on a finding of irrigation
suitability of the soils.
6. The Polecat Bench Area was first studied for development in 1919. Investigations
and study of this area has continued for many years. In 1966 a feasibility report for Polecat
Bench was published and in March 1970 a reevaluation statement was prepared which
updated the economic and financial analyses. These two reports were published as House
Document No. 92-340, 92nd Congress, 2nd session. Congressional hearings on Polecat
Bench were held in 1972 in Powell, Wyoming, and in Washington, D.C. On March 11, 1976,
the Polecat Bench area, Shoshone Extensions Unit was re-authorized for construction as a
Pick-Sloan project under P.L. 94-228, 94 Congress. The Polecat Bench Area was intended to
receive its share of stored water from Buffalo Bill Reservoir as it would also share in the cost
of the dam and reservoir when the area was developed. Development has not been pursued
due to lack of local interest.
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7. The Narrows Unit was authorized in March 1970 by P.L 91-389 as a multi-purpose
water resource development project. The Final Environmental Statement was issued in
1976. A general review of water projects by the Carter administration delayed funding of the
project when Interior deleted funding for the project from its fiscal 1978 budget request and
funding was again denied in the Continuing Appropriations Act, 1979. In 1981, Congress
directed Reclamation to use available funds to begin appraisal and final design work. A
Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement was issued March 4, 1985. During
this entire period, environmental concerns continued to plague the project. In 1987,
Reclamation issued a Draft Biological Opinion on Narrows which raised the issue of impacts
to threatened and endangered species in the Platte River System from the project. These
issues have prevented further development on the project.
8. The Nebraska Mid-State Division was authorized on November 14, 1967 under
P.L. 90-136. From the onset, environmental concerns and slow signups of potential
irrigators delayed progress on the project. Continued reevaluation of the project to address
environmental issues on the Platte River led to significant changes in the project and
declining local support. A substitute project known as the Prairie Bend Project was
investigated in the same general area and found to be infeasible under P&G standards (but
feasible using "customized procedures").
9. The O'Neil Unit was authorized in 1972 under P. L. 92-514 with appropriations
authorized in 1976 when construction commenced. However, lawsuits over the adequacy of
National Environmental Policy Act compliance halted construction. Reevaluation and
reformulation studies continued but no further action has been taken. The Niobrara Scenic
River Designation Act of 1991 provided a 5-year moratorium on the stretch of river
containing the diversion site for the project pending funding for construction. On May 24,
1996, this stretch of river became part of the scenic river designation because construction
had not commenced.
10. The initial stage of the Oahe Unit, South Dakota was authorized on August 3, 1968
by P.L. 90-453. The primary purpose of the Oahe Unit, as authorized, provided for irrigation
of 190,000 acres, fish and wildlife conservation and enhancement, recreation, municipal
water supplies, flood control and other project purposes. In 1960 voters within a 15½-county
area in Northeastern South Dakota approved the creation of the Oahe Conservancy SubDistrict (OCSD). Construction began in 1974. Organized opposition to the Oahe Unit
surfaced in 1973 with the formation of an organization known as United Family Farmers
(UFF). UFF opposed development on several grounds including environmental and
economic and succeed in electing members to the OCSD board. Meanwhile the project was
made part of President Carter's Federal water project review. The wildlife plan by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service was expanded at the same time and required substantially more
land to be acquired for that purpose. The OCSD Board subsequently passed a resolution on
May 21, 1977, indicating that the Oahe Unit was not acceptable, not worthy of further
funding, and not in the best interest of the people of OSCD. Oahe Unit construction was
subsequently halted on September 30, 1977. Alternative uses of the existing project
facilities have been the subject of several planning studies but none has proven feasible for
authorization to date.
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